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 This thesis seeks to analyze various interpretations of Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty since 1949.  Variations in interpretations of Article 5 requirements throw 
light on evolving conceptions of national security interests and the international security 
environment.  To do so it analyzes these perceptions in three historical periods:  the Cold 
War, 1949 to 1989, the post-Cold War, 1989 to 10 September 2001, and post-11 
September 2001 to its submission.  Through this analysis, it is shown that the collective 
defense provision of Article 5 was the foundational principle of the Cold War Alliance.  
During this period, however, collective defense necessarily required adaptation in order 
to remain credible to the current threat.  The adaptability constructed during the Cold 
War years lead to the conceptualization of threat in a broader context during the post-
Cold War period.  Subsequently, following the first invocation of Article 5 following the 
11 September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, the actions taken by NATO and 
the individual Allies are highly dissimilar to the original concept of NATO’s collective 
defense principles—defense against the Soviet Union.  The adaptability of Article 5 
shown throughout NATO’s   history serves to portend that in the future, Article 5 will 
remain a highly valued and integral component of the Alliance’s approach to security in 
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I.  NATIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE 
NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY, 1949-2002 
This thesis seeks to analyze various interpretations of Article 5 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty since 1949.  Variations in interpretations of Article 5 requirements throw 
light on evolving conceptions of national security interests and the international security 
environment.  
Following the attacks against the United States by terrorists on 11 September 
2001, the North Atlantic Council (NAC), the supreme decision-making body of the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, issued a statement: “The NATO nations unanimously 
condemn these barbaric acts committed against a NATO member state.”1  The NAC 
further stated that the United States could “rely on its 18 Allies in North America and 
Europe for assistance and support.”2  The following day the NAC stated that its invoking 
of Article 5 was qualified:  “The Council agreed that if it is determined that this attack 
was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action 
covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty.” 
On 2 October 2001, the Alliance invoked, without qualification, Article 5 of the 
North Atlantic Treaty (also know as the Washington Treaty), which states that:  “an 
armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all.”3 On 4 October 2001, the other 18 allies agreed to 
eight measures of assistance requested by the United States under Article 5 that will assist 
Washington in its operations against terrorists.   During the previous 52 years of the 
Alliance’s history Article 5 was never invoked.  
The Brussels Treaty of 1948, a defensive pact involving Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, preceded NATO.  Unlike the 
Brussels Treaty, which requires its signatories to provide “all the military and other aid 
and assistance in their power”4 to any of the High Contracting Parties that comes under 
                                                 
1 North Atlantic Council, Press Release 122, 11 September 2001.  
2 Ibid. 
3 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Article 5.  
1 
4 Heads of State of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and United Kingdom, “Treaty of 
attack, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty lacks the same level of automaticity of 
military action:   
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in 
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all 
and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence 
recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist 
the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in 
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including 
the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North 
Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall 
immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be 
terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to 
restore and maintain international peace and security.5  
Article 5 therefore includes the implicit requirements of collective defense, but 
also the flexibility of action required to allow the member nations a degree of latitude for 
individual national interpretations of Alliance obligations.  There have been two levels of 
discourse among allies relating to Article 5:  the rhetorical, focused on the maintenance 
of consensus within the alliance; and the pragmatic, the individual dealings and decisions 
and actions of the states that compose NATO, often adjusted to domestic political 
requirements. 
It is the inherent collective defense nature of Article 5, standing as the “magnetic 
core”6 of the Alliance, which has provided for the security of its members.  The built-in 
flexibility has nonetheless provided NATO the means to adapt to national pressures and 
idiosyncrasies, as well as to deal with the varying contemporary challenges of Euro-
Atlantic security.  This view of Article 5 is summarized in a North Atlantic Council press 
release of 12 September 2001: “The commitment to collective self-defense embodied in 
                                                 
Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, the Brussels Treaty,” 17 March 
1948, Article IV, Treaty available at:  http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b480317a.htm.  This became 
Article V in the revised Brussels Treaty of 23 October 1954. 
5 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Article 5. 
6 Zbigniew Brzezinski.  “NATO:  The Dilemmas of Expansion,” The National Interest, No. 53, Fall 
1998, pp. 14. 
2 
the Washington Treaty was first entered into in circumstances very different from those 
that exist now, but it remains no less valid and no less essential today.”7 
  This thesis consists of five chapters, including this introduction.  Chapter II 
begins with a short appraisal of the effects of the failure of the League of Nations 
collective security pact on the development of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  The 
chapter continues by focusing on the interpretations given to Article 5 during the Cold 
War era.  This chapter considers the period from the 1948-1949 formational discourse on 
an alliance between nations of Western Europe and North America to the collapse of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991.  Chapter III examines the post-
Cold War “decade” from November 1989 to September 2001. The additional 
“fundamental security tasks” of the Alliance adopted during this period supplemented 
collective defense with a broader program envisaging security for the entire Euro-
Atlantic region, partnerships with former adversaries and non-NATO countries, and crisis 
management, including crisis response operations.8   
Chapter IV analyzes the findings presented in the previous two chapters. This 
analysis is applied to the response by the Alliance and its members to the 11 September 
2001 attacks on the United States.  Special attention is given to patterns of behavior and 
interpretation that have been consistent throughout all three periods.  The chapter also 
evaluates the extent to which contingent factors of Article 5 interpretation in the earlier 
periods have a causal relationship with the actions taken by the allies since 11 September 
2001.   
Chapter V places the examination of the changing meanings of Article 5 in a 
broader context:  the features of the Alliance that have allowed it to adapt and redefine its 
purposes in a new security environment.  Different interpretations of Article 5 are a direct 
result of NATO’s ability to adapt to changes in the Euro-Atlantic security environment.   
                                                 
7 North Atlantic Council, Press Release 124, 12 September 2001. 
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II. ARTICLE 5 DURING THE COLD WAR  
This chapter examines the significance of Article 5 during the Cold War through 
the consideration of three critical and illustrative cases.  The first is the process by which 
West German military forces were established for the defense of Western Europe, and by 
which West Germany gained subsequent membership in NATO.  Second, this chapter 
examines the Alliance debate on the shift from a “massive retaliation” deterrence policy 
to a strategy of “flexible response” to deter and counter aggression against the Allies.  
Third, the withdrawal of France from NATO‘s integrated military structure is examined, 
together with its implications for Article 5.  Throughout the Cold War, Article 5 remained 
a primary interest for each of the Allies.  There was room for the pursuit of national 
interests as long as those interests did not interfere with or threaten NATO’s collective 
defense guarantee. 
A. ADMITTANCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY TO 
NATO 
By 1947-48, some of the Western powers began to devise collective defense 
arrangements.  In 1947 Britain and France signed the Treaty of Dunkirk, which was 
oriented against a possible German resurgence.  In 1948 five European nations9 signed 
the collective defense-oriented Brussels Treaty, creating the Western Union, “in the event 
of a renewal by Germany of a policy of aggression.”10 However, by the late 1940’s there 
was growing recognition that the greatest post-war threat to Western Europe and the 
United States was posed by the Soviet Union, not Germany.  Moreover, some 
governments held that any defensive pact that united the West against the Soviets would 
necessarily have to include German participation.  British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin 
wrote to Prime Minister Clement Attlee that “the Germans have a great contribution to 
make … Our aim is to protect ourselves against any further aggression by Germany and 
                                                 
9 The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, The 
Brussels Treaty, was signed by the Heads of State and Government of Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom in Brussels on 17 March 1948.   
10 The Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, The 
Brussels Treaty, 17 March 1948, Preface, available online at:  
http://www.nato.int/docu/basictxt/b480317a.htm. 
5 
at the same time to bring her back into the community of nations as a united entity on a 
democratic basis.”11 
With the conclusion of the North Atlantic Treaty on 4 April 1949, the French, 
British, and US occupation forces in Germany became dual-hatted as front-line troops to 
deter Soviet invasion.  NATO’s official strategy of forward defense was designed to 
“Hold the enemy as far to the east in Germany as possible.”12  Through the forward force 
deployments of the Allies, West Germany also received the benefits of NATO collective 
defense, and concern grew in the Alliance over the de facto defense of a non-NATO 
member. 
1. The Impact of the Korean War 
The invasion of South Korea in 1950 served as a catalyst to German integration 
into NATO, and the Korean War accelerated the development of NATO as an institution. 
Six Allies13 fought in the Korean War, which brought forth the realization that the 
defense of Europe and the containment of communism abroad would require large Allied 
military forces.14  Without a large conventional force, organized, trained and equipped in 
peace time, the defense of Europe would be impossible.  On 26 September 1950, the 
NAC agreed to “the establishment at the earliest possible date of an integrated force 
under centralized command, which shall be adequate to deter aggression and to ensure 
the defence of Western Europe … organized under the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization.”15  Additionally, the NAC stated that to increase the defense potential of 
the Allies, “Germany should be enabled to contribute to the build-up of the defence of 
Western Europe,” and “requested the Defence Committee to make recommendations at 
the earliest possible date as to the methods by which Germany could most usefully make 
                                                 
11 Sean Kay, NATO and the Future of European Security (Oxford:  Rowman and Littlefield 
Publishers, 1998), p. 18. 
12 NATO Military Committee, DC –13, North Atlantic Treaty Organization Medium Term Plan, Paris, 
28 March 1950, Part I – Defense Policy and Concept of Operations, par. 10, subset a, in Gregory G. 
Pedlow, NATO Strategy Documents, 1949-1969, available online at: 
http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a500328d.pdf. 
13 Belgium, Canada, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States fought 
in Korea from 1950 to 1953, as did Greece and Turkey. The latter two nations joined NATO in 1952. 
14 Thomas Risse-Kappen, Cooperation Among Democracies:  European Influence on US Foreign 
Policy (Princeton;  Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 42-43.  
15 North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, New York, United States, 26 September 1950, 
available online at:  http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c500926a.htm. 
6 
its contribution.”16  The challenge was how to integrate West Germany and 
simultaneously alleviate lingering distrust from World War II. The debate on German 
inclusion lasted from 1948 until 1955, leading General Eisenhower to remark that the 
Allies were “either going to solve this German problem, or the Soviets will solve it in 
their favor.”17 
2. The European Defense Community 
The integration of West Germany into Western defense became a political battle 
primarily between the United States and France.  The United States preferred immediate 
Allied status for West Germany, but France was wary of any agreement that would not 
continue tight occupational control of its former adversary.  On 26 October 1950 French 
Prime Minister René Pleven led the French National Assembly to recommend “the 
creation, for our common defense, of a European Army tied to political institutions of a 
united Europe,” and proposed to “invite Great Britain and the free countries of 
continental Europe, should they agree to participate with it in the creation of a European 
army, to work together on ways of realizing the principles just stated.”18  The “Pleven 
Plan” called for a European Defense Community, or EDC, and sought to establish a 
multi-national, all-European force of 100,000 troops under a European Ministry of 
Defense; the EDC was to be separate from, but associated with, NATO.19  The EDC 
would have met French requirements for German participation in Western defense, but 
with constraints on West Germany’s armed forces.  West Germany would have 
contributed 20% of the forces,20 but these forces would have remained tightly controlled 
by other European nations, particularly France.21  Moreover, the EDC would have 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Eisenhower quoted in Robert S. Jordan, Generals in International Politics:  NATO’s Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (Lexington:  The University Press of Kentucky, 1987), p. 26. 
18 French National Assembly, The Pleven Plan, 26 October 1950, Leiden University Historical 
Institute, History of European Integration, available at:  
http://www.let.leidenuniv.nl/history/rtg/res1/pleven.htm. 
19 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York:  W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 458. 
20 Robert S. Jordan, Generals in International Politics, p. 26. 
7 
21 According to Donald Abenheim, the West German contingent in the EDC would be composed of  
“310,000 men, including attached staffs, combat support units, schools, and training facilities … 
concentrated in armored and armored infantry divisions of thirteen thousand men each. A tactical Airforce 
would be organized with squadrons or wings of thirty-six to seventy-five aircraft … under national 
command.  A total of 1350 aircraft and eight-five thousand men would make up the West German air 
contingent for the EDC … German units in a coastal defense navy would operate in Western European 
prevented the creation of a German Ministry of Defense, a German arms industry, and a 
German general staff.22   
The structure of the EDC also conformed to NATO’s desire to increase European 
conventional forces to enhance its deterrent strength.  At the Lisbon ministerial meeting 
of 1952, the NAC concluded that the “principles underlying the Treaty to establish the 
European Defence Community conformed to the interests of the Parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty.”23  Through arrangements made at Lisbon, provisions of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, principally Article 5, would be extended to the members of the EDC, 
including West Germany.  The extension of Article 5 protection to a non-NATO country 
was a drastic adaptation of Alliance commitments, and it was brought about because the 
Allies were convinced that 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Defence 
Community have a common objective, to strengthen the defence of the 
Atlantic area, and that the development of the European Defence 
Community should be carried forward in this spirit. Therefore, the Council 
considered that the obligations and relationships between the Communities 
should be based on the concept of two closely related organizations, one 
working, so far as this objective is concerned, within the framework of, 
and reinforcing the other. 24 
At the following ministerial meeting in December 1952, the NAC fully asserted the 
EDC’s importance to NATO strategy and stressed: 
the paramount importance which the Atlantic Community attaches to the 
rapid entry into force of the Treaty establishing the European Defence 
Community and consequently to its ratification by all the signatories, as 
well as to the ratification of the Additional Protocol to the North Atlantic 
Treaty on guarantees given by the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty to 
members of the European Defence Community.25 
 
                                                 
waters.” Donald Abenheim, Reforging the Iron Cross:  The Search for Tradition in the West German 
Armed Forces (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 105-06. 
22 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 458. 
23 North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Lisbon 25 February 1952, par. 3, available online at:  
http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c520225a.htm. 
24 Ibid. 
25 North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, Paris, 18 December 1952, resolution 3, available online 
at:  http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/49-95/c521218a.htm. 
8 
a. EDC Debate Between the United States and France 
Both the United States and France realized that it was in their interests to 
incorporate West Germany into Western Europe’s defense. The United States maintained 
three policy goals in Western Europe:  the military incorporation of West Germany, the 
promotion of European unity, and conditions that would allow for the withdrawal of US 
forces from Europe—all of which were interrelated.26  A West German military 
contribution would help meet all three goals by anchoring West Germany as a peaceful 
democracy and partner in a united Western Europe.  According to the US State 
Department:  “It is of greatest importance that we adopt a policy which will tie Germany 
in solidly with the West.  It is also most important that Germany contribute to the 
collective defense of the West.”27 
General Eisenhower, the newly appointed NATO Supreme Allied 
Commander, Europe (SACEUR), considered the EDC “more divisive than unifying in its 
effect on the Western European countries,” which was reason enough for the United 
States to avoid “encouragement or personal participation.”28  The EDC initiative included 
“every kind of obstacle, difficulty, and fantastic notion that misguided humans could put 
together in one package.”29  However, SACEUR desired a force of 50 to 60 divisions, not 
including units from West Germany, which would provide a credible deterrent in support 
of collective defense measures, but would not threaten the Soviet Union.  The 60 division 
force requirement was considered at the Alliance’s ministerial meeting at Lisbon, 
Portugal, in February 1952, which established NATO’s most ambitious conventional 
force goals: 50 divisions, 4,000 aircraft and 704 combat vessels by 1953, and 75 divisions 
and 6,500 combat aircraft by 1954; 30 to 40 divisions were to be combat ready at all 
times.30  However, with the economic and political difficulties encountered shortly after 
                                                 
26 Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation, p. 558. 
27 US State Department, Memorandum for the President, Outline of Secretary Acheson’s Presentation 
of North Atlantic Treaty Problems to General Eisenhower, Washington DC, 4 January 1951, From the 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available online at:  
www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato29-5.htm. 
28 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to US Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, 3 August 




30 Robert S. Jordan, Norstad:  Cold War NATO Supreme Commander:  Airman, Strategist, Diplomat 
the Lisbon meeting, West German military contributions represented the only way in 
which the United States could achieve its policy goals in post-war Europe.  According to 
Eisenhower, the EDC was “the only immediate hope … [for] developing, on a basis 
acceptable to other European countries, the German strength that is vital to us.”31   
France held that the necessary West German military forces could only be 
established if West Germany remained controlled by the occupying powers.  If not, the 
French feared, an independent and rearmed Germany could return to the Bismarckian 
policies of the late 19th Century; that is, Germany might switch allegiances between the 
East and West.  It appears that US Secretary of State Dean Acheson shared the French 
concerns that emphasizing the significance of Germany’s defense contribution might put 
the Germans “in a bargaining position where they can attempt to fix maximum and even 
unreasonable conditions.”32  Therefore, France continued to structure the West German 
role under the EDC treaty so that the West German contribution would be essentially 
subordinated to France. 
General Eisenhower was reported as saying that he did not “give a damn 
about their [the Germans’] quarrels with France.”33  Eisenhower attested that he had: 
come to the conclusion that at the very bottom of all their [the French] 
“backing and filling,” their seemingly contradictory statements and 
actions, is an instinctive, inbred fear of Germany and the Germans … 
This, in turn, makes them fear that in any collective venture in Europe, be 
it political, economic, military, or all three, Germany would completely 
dominate … [I]t is a very real thing and its influence, I am convinced, is 
very marked. 34 
                                                 
(New York:  St. Martin’s Press, Inc., 2000), p. 84. 
31 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to General George C. Marshall, Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe, 3 August 1951, From the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available online at:  
www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato43-3.htm.  
32 US State Department, Memorandum for the President, Outline of Secretary Acheson’s Presentation 
of North Atlantic Treaty Problems to General Eisenhower, Washington DC, 4 January 1951, From the 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available online at:  
www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato29-5.htm. 
33 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Meeting with The President and the Cabinet, Washington DC, 31 
January 1951, p. 8, From the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available online at:  
www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/nato_development/nato43-3.htm 
34 General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Letter to President Harry S. Truman, 9 February 1952, From the 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, available online at:  
www.whistlestop.org/study_collections/nato/large/eisenhower/nato60-2.htm. 
10 
President Truman perceived France’s circumstances differently, in that he saw a prospect 
of overcoming French fears.  Truman wrote in reply to Eisenhower as follows: 
I can understand the French fear of Germany.  Since 1870, 1914, 1942 and 
1943 they, of course, have grounds for fear of their northern neighbor but I 
am hoping that the program which we have in view will tend to alleviate 
that fear and that we can get … Europe in a position where we can attain a 
long time peaceful settlement of our present difficulties.35 
3. The Defeat of the EDC and West Germany’s Membership in NATO 
After four years of debate over the EDC’s composition and structure, in 1954 the 
French National Assembly’s action on a procedural motion effectively defeated the treaty 
on the European Defense Community.  The National Assembly did not vote directly on 
the EDC Treaty, to the frustration of its supporters and opponents.  The EDC had been 
reduced to a political debate between the Allies, each with a different set of national 
priorities regarding West German inclusion.  Additionally, whereas Belgium, France, 
Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West Germany had signed the EDC treaty, the 
United Kingdom did not, severely lessening the EDC’s ability to control West Germany 
within its institutional structure.  The EDC began to lose support.  Knowing the 
importance placed on West German participation by the United Kingdom and United 
States, France was able to use its Allies’ preferences as a political lever to request US and 
British assistance with its war in Indochina.  France attempted to use the Alliance to 
counter its colonial military difficulties, but with little success.   
Following the demise of the EDC, US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and 
British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, knowing that the West German contribution to 
Western defense had been sidetracked for far too long, proceeded to “fast-track” West 
Germany into NATO.  To provide for the rapid accession of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, the United States and the United Kingdom promised to permanently base 
troops within West Germany.36  The US and UK commitments to maintain forces on the 
European continent, not only to counterbalance the Soviets, but also to hedge against the 
possible dangers associated with German rearmament, was said to have had an 
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“immediate—and profound” effect on many of the French.37 NATO reassurance meant 
that Germany, the most economically powerful of the continental European states, would 
not seek commensurate military power through an independent security policy. 
Moreover, unlike the ever-weakening EDC, the United States had the power to 
counterbalance potential German influence within NATO, and prevent it from 
“unlimbering its muscles” in Europe. 38 
The NAC met in October 1954 to “approve arrangements designed to bring about 
the full association of the Federal Republic of Germany with the West, and a German 
defense contribution.”39  During the Council’s sessions three key protocols for German 
accession to the Alliance were advanced.  First, the occupying powers informed the 
Council of the “termination of the Occupational Regime in the Federal Republic.” 
Second, the Brussels Treaty powers agreed to “invite the Federal Republic of Germany 
and Italy to accede to the Brussels Treaty,” thereby binding West Germany to the defense 
of the Brussels Treaty Allies. Third, West Germany’s membership in NATO was linked 
to its membership in the Western European Union, and the Council expected “the closest  
cooperation between the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation.”40  With West German adherence to the three protocols, and “Being 
satisfied that the security of the North Atlantic area will be enhanced by the accession of 
the Federal Republic of Germany to that Treaty,”41 the North Atlantic Council, under 
Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty,42 “approved a Protocol to the North Atlantic 
Treaty inviting the Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO.”43  
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42 “The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further 
the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this 
Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession 
C. FLEXIBLE RESPONSE 
1. Massive Retaliation 
The Allies had sought a West German military contribution to create a credible 
conventional deterrent.  However, as West Germany was being integrated into NATO, it 
was becoming apparent that, although NATO was economically superior to the Soviet 
Union and the Warsaw Pact, NATO governments were unwilling, for political reasons, to 
pay the costs of matching Soviet conventional military capabilities.  In 1953 the 
Eisenhower Administration proposed the “New Look” defensive strategy to “gain greater 
military effectiveness” from shrinking defense budgets.44 Under the New Look, “The 
major deterrent to aggression against Western Europe is the manifest determination of the 
United States to use its atomic capability and massive retaliatory power if the [NATO] 
area is attacked.”45  NATO adopted a similar position, culminating in the NATO defense 
policy document MC 48, which stated that NATO’s conventional forces “would be 
unable to prevent the rapid overrunning of Europe unless NATO immediately employed 
these [nuclear] weapons both strategically and tactically.”46 
2. Strategic Reevaluation 
By the late 1950s, strategic adaptations were altering the possibility of a massive 
and calculated invasion from the East.  The Soviet Union possessed long-range strategic 
bombers, and with the launch of Sputnik in 1957, Moscow acquired the ability to use 
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles to attack Europe and the United States. This eroded the 
strategic superiority on which the US policy of threatening “massive retaliation” was 
predicated.  NATO recognized that the probability of nuclear devastation would preclude 
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any major offensive against the Allies.  However, because of the prospective 
consequences of massive retaliation, NATO’s nuclear policy was useful only as a 
deterrent, and it could never be used in actual combat, because “if implemented, [it] 
would have destroyed NATO instead of defending it.”47  
The fact that army divisions were no match for nuclear weapons was not lost on 
either NATO or the Soviet Union.  Moscow began to confront the Alliance with a wide 
range of threats, both nuclear and conventional.  Instead of invasion, according to an 
official US assessment in 1964, the Allies faced the threat of limited Soviet actions 
including “probes and excursions against the flanks of the Alliance; repression followed 
by a revolt in Eastern Europe; harsh demands against friendly neutrals; renewed 
challenges to Western rights in Berlin or increased Soviet military intrusion into the 
Mediterranean area.”48   Western officials feared that the Soviet Union might provoke a 
limited conflict in order to propagate a general war with the Alliance, with the hope of 
circumventing a nuclear response.  According to classified US analysis in 1964, a major 
Soviet aggression could: 
in fact grow out of an ambiguous situation.  It would, for example, be easy 
for them to provoke us into the implementation of some of our 
contingency plans for Berlin access which would give them an excuse to 
escalate on a large conventional scale.49 
3. The JFK Administration 
The pursuit of a new deterrent strategy for NATO was initiated with the election 
of John F. Kennedy to the US Presidency and his appointment of Robert S. McNamara to 
the post of Secretary of Defense.  The Kennedy administration saw the emerging flaws of 
massive retaliation, and developed a new strategy of flexible response, in which 
conventional forces had the predominant role.  The new strategy sought to control the 
escalation of conflict, without an immediate nuclear exchange, in order to bring about 
rapid war-termination and the restoration of the security and integrity of the NATO area.  
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Military response would be calibrated to the type and scope of aggression; the use of 
purely conventional means might be  followed by the use of tactical nuclear arms, and (if 
necessary) strategic nuclear forces.   
Unlike massive retaliation, flexible response allowed for the managed escalation 
of conflict, as a means to provide for a rapid cessation of hostilities.  By providing room 
for escalation, the strategy would force stoppage points in a conflict in which 
“Calculations of gain or loss will be made just before and after a large quantum of force 
is applied.”50  Rather than acting as a “tripwire”51 to massive retaliatory strikes, 
conventional forces would prevent Soviet gains in limited actions against the Alliance in 
which a nuclear retaliation would be excessive.  Additionally, if limited aggression did 
occur, conventional superiority could enforce a pause in the conflict, allowing for 
political deliberation and diplomatic efforts at resolution.52  In such scenarios, 
conventional force would essentially postpone the use of nuclear weapons, deterring 
conflict and ultimate destruction, while also being able to counter a limited attack if 
necessary.  The United States argued in 1964 that the Alliance could “develop a suitable 
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non-nuclear option, just as the Soviets have maintained theirs … without in any way 
reducing the deterrent to a massive Soviet conventional attack.”53 
4. European Concerns 
America’s “flexible response” strategy was neither politically nor militarily 
attractive to the European Allies.  It was politically repellent because of the memories of 
two previous conventional World Wars.  It was militarily abhorrent because of the  
financial expenditures associated with a conventional force build-up.54  Additionally, 
flexible response was perceived by some European Allies as an overture to the 
withdrawal of forces, and political decoupling, of the United States from Europe, and 
subsequent US-Soviet settlements apart from NATO.  The European Allies opposed 
flexible response on three grounds:  the centralized control of nuclear weapons by the 
United States, the potentially increased possibility of a conventional war in Europe, and 
the expense of creating a large conventional force structure. 
a. Centralized Nuclear Control 
Since flexible response was based on the controlled escalation of conflict, 
nuclear decision-making had to be tightly centralized.  A loose or bifurcated nuclear 
policy might hamper America’s ability to manage escalation. Moreover, the independent 
nuclear forces of France and Britain created multiple decision-making processes that  
(some Americans argued) would make a flexible response harder to maintain and control.  
Secretary McNamara referred to such national nuclear forces as “expensive, prone to 
obsolescence, and lacking in credibility as a deterrent.”55  Some European Allies 
perceived US insistence on nuclear arrangements which maintained the decision-making 
in Washington as a means to maintain US predominance.  Although the United States 
maintained a large conventional military presence in Europe throughout the Cold War, 
and France developed an autonomous nuclear capability, flexible response was viewed by 
some of the European Allies as a means by which they would carry the heaviest 
responsibility for conventional forces in any limited or major conflicts that might occur in 
Europe. 
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b. Conventional War in Europe 
The European Allies generally believed that a massive retaliatory deterrent 
was the most effective means by which to ensure that there would not be another major 
war in Europe.  If the Soviet Union did not believe in NATO’s steadfast resolve to 
immediately counter any aggressive acts against the West with an immediate nuclear 
response, or that a nuclear response might be delayed, the Soviet Union might be 
encouraged to risk invasion and employ tactics for protracted land war.56  Those opposed 
to flexible response believed that the Soviet Union would devise a strategy to prolong the 
escalatory measures of flexible response in order to delay a nuclear counter-attack as long 
as possible and gain a relatively advantageous settlement to the conflict.  The European 
Allies (like the North American Allies) wanted neither conventional nor nuclear war, but 
rather sought to deter war in general through the most efficacious means.  In the 
predominant European view, escalatory deterrence would not necessarily prevent armed 
conflict, whereas the threat of a general nuclear response would deter all forms of 
aggression.  European opposition to flexible response found a proponent in US General 
Lauris Norstad, then SACEUR.  Norstad believed that it would be unwise to assume that 
Soviet intentions could be divined, or that Soviet military actions could be controlled 
through escalatory measures: 
While preparing to exploit any favorable developments, we must not 
confuse the wish with the fact.  We should therefore consider, very 
carefully, our ability to enforce a graduated, controlled development of the 
battle, and not over-estimate the extent to which we can dictate the Soviet 
response, particularly in a situation where it is unlikely that we would 
have the initiative.57  
Moreover, with its preponderance in conventional forces, the USSR had the ability to 
out-escalate any non-nuclear NATO response. 
c. Financial Costs of Flexible Response 
The European Allies were willing to coordinate their national defense 
policies in return for a US nuclear guarantee that allowed them to focus on post-war 
economic, industrial and political reconstruction.  Nuclear deterrence eliminated the 
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requirement for large standing and expensive conventional forces, and the European 
Allies opposed any plans that required increased defense spending for non-nuclear forces. 
In April 1965 the NATO Military Committee released a report which expressed the 
judgment that in a non-nuclear invasion by the Soviet Union, Allied forces could hold 
their forward positions and/or control the airspace over friendly units and territory for a 
period of no more than one to three days.58  At the same time, a NATO force planning 
exercise determined that the flexible response strategy required a manpower increase of 
500,000 to 750,000 personnel and defense budget increases between 20 and 30 percent, 
roughly US $5.6 billion to $8.4 billion.59  In the overall schema of Western defense, large 
spending increases did not seem to be the wisest course of action, as a stronger deterrent 
was readily available through nuclear weapons, without the additional costs associated 
with a conventional force build-up.   
5. Compromises and MC 14/3 
Flexible response remained a contentious issue among the Allies throughout the 
mid 1960s.  The United States remained committed to flexible response, while the 
European Allies, particularly the French, opposed any strategy that did not call for the 
immediate use of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet invasion.  The two sides were 
brought closer to an agreement on flexible response by multiple factors, including the 
French withdrawal from the integrated military structure in 1966, the emphasis on 
collective decision-making in the realm of nuclear issues, and the increased involvement 
of the United States in Vietnam.60  An agreement to include the European Allies in the 
nuclear decision-making process facilitated European acceptance of the new strategy. 
From the strategy’s proposal in 1961, up to its adoption in 1967, there were several 
efforts to involve the European Allies in the nuclear decision-making process.   
Additionally, the Allies desired to include some elements of nuclear deterrence in 
flexible response.  Under MC 14/3, the NATO Strategic Concept based on flexible 
response, the Alliance would attempt to “defeat the aggression on the level at which the 
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enemy chooses to fight.”61  The concept, called direct defense, was a guarantee to the 
European Allies that NATO would strive to prevent escalation in Europe beyond what 
was required to deter further aggression.  Through direct defense, tactical and general 
nuclear response capabilities—“the ultimate deterrent and, if used, the ultimate military 
response”62—were maintained to deter limited nuclear or massive conventional attack by 
the Soviet Union.  
The NATO Defense Planning Committee adopted MC 14/3 – The Overall 
Strategic Concept for the Defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Area - on 12 
December 1967.  Under MC 14/3: 
The overall defensive concept of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is 
to preserve peace and to provide for the security of the North Atlantic 
Treaty area primarily by a credible deterrence, effected by confronting any 
possible, threatened or actual aggression, ranging from covert operations 
to all-out nuclear war, with adequate NATO forces.63 
True to its original conception, the strategy of flexible response was designed to counter a 
full range of threats posed by the Soviet Union: 
a. Major nuclear aggression with the aim of destroying to as large an 
extent as possible NATO’s military potential and, in particular, Allied 
world-wide nuclear retaliatory capabilities together with attacks on 
industrial and population centres. 
b. Major aggression, possibly supported by tactical nuclear and chemical 
weapons, delivered simultaneously against the Northern, Central and 
Southern Regions of ACE [Allied Command Europe] and extended into 
the sea areas. 
c. Major aggression against one or two land regions of NATO with or 
without tactical nuclear and chemical weapons. 
d. Nuclear or non-nuclear operations, restricted to the sea areas of NATO, 
and directed against NATO forces, shipping and sealines of 
communications. 
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e. A limited aggression determined by a particular situation, against an 
individual NATO country. Such an attack could be confined to a particular 
area. 
f. A renewed harassment or blockade of West Berlin, or an attack on West 
Berlin. 
g. Covert actions, incursions or infiltrations … in the NATO area. 
h. Politico-military pressures and threats against one or more members of 
the Alliance involving ultimatums, military demonstrations, deployment 
of forces, mobilisation and other related incidents. 64 
Moreover, MC 14/3 directed: 
The ground, sea and air forces of the Alliance should be capable of rapid, 
flexible and effective reaction against the various forms of limited 
aggression. To provide the necessary flexibility and to meet the need for 
direct defence these forces require adequate mobility, fire-power, 
communications and logistics, and the capability to conduct a wide range 
of defensive and offensive operations, including the selective and 
discriminatory use of nuclear weapons.65 
D. FRANCE’S WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO’S INTEGRATED MILITARY 
STRUCTURE 
1. Foundations of French Disenchantment 
French difficulties within the North Atlantic Alliance entered a new phase with 
the accession of Charles de Gaulle to the French Presidency in 1958.  President de 
Gaulle’s convictions about France’s proper role within the international political system 
complicated France’s relations with its Allies.  De Gaulle considered France one of the 
world’s great powers along with China, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, and therefore due a commensurate level of international respect.  He 
propounded a recognition of French grandeur, or prestige, in international affairs.  In the 
President’s words, France, “because [it] can, because everything summons [it] to do so, 
because [it] is France, must lead a global policy in the centre of the world.”66   
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The desire for the proper recognition for France created an awkward relationship 
with the United States, which was further strained by the US primacy within NATO.  On 
one hand, the United States was the obstacle to France’s efforts to regain primacy in 
Western Europe.  On the other hand, the recognition de Gaulle desired could only be 
provided by the United States, as the foremost world power.67 
a. Suez Crisis, 1956 
De Gaulle’s attitude toward NATO was greatly influenced by the Suez 
Crisis of 1956. The major Allied issue concerning the actions taken in Egypt by the 
French and the British was the lack of consultation before the hostilities.68  Secretary of 
State Dulles was reported to have commented to French Ambassador Hervé Alphand that 
“both the British and the French had deliberately kept the United States Government in 
the dark for the past two weeks … He felt that this was the blackest day which has 
occurred in many years in the relations between England and France and the United 
States.”69 
For General de Gaulle, the outrage expressed by the United States and 
some other Allies was representative of NATO’s major shortcoming, that other Allies 
could “sermonize,” or attempt to impede an Ally in its pursuit of its national interests.  It 
was unacceptable in his view that France, or any other power, would have to consult with 
other nations when pursuing its interests. In reaction to American opposition to the Suez 
intervention, de Gaulle stated that “We should have told the Americans this is what we 
want to do and if you do not accept it, the Atlantic pact is no more.  They would have 
gone along.”70  In de Gaulle’s view, France was increasingly dependent on NATO 
policies, and he sought to reverse the trend immediately after becoming President. 
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b. Problems with NATO and the Tripartite Directorate 
De Gaulle did not hold the North Atlantic Alliance in high regard, and set 
the tone for France’s dealings with NATO shortly after taking office in 1958.  On 17 
September, de Gaulle sent President Eisenhower and British Prime Minister Macmillan a 
memorandum in which he conveyed his attitude toward NATO.  The memorandum 
explained de Gaulle’s three primary perceptions of NATO deficiencies:  1) The United 
States no longer was the single dominant nuclear power and therefore did not 
unambiguously speak for the West’s defense; 2) France could no longer participate in 
NATO arrangements it regarded as obsolete; and 3) NATO nuclear issues should be 
decided by France, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 71 
In his 1958 memorandum, de Gaulle also proposed that, since NATO was 
not entirely relevant to the contemporary security situation, a Tripartite Directorate 
consisting of France, the United Kingdom and the United States should be formed to 
direct NATO. The directorate would exist as an outside institution that, while not part of 
NATO, would be superior to the Alliance.  The directorate would plan conventional and 
nuclear military actions on a global basis.72  President Eisenhower responded in October 
1958 that de Gaulle’s proposal would not be acceptable to the United States:   
We cannot afford to adopt any system which would give to our other 
Allies, or other free world countries, the impression that basic decisions 
affecting their own vital interests are being made without their 
participation.73  
Secretary of State Dulles emphasized in December of the same year that the United States 
would not participate in a directorate that would be superior to NATO or more sovereign 
than any state.74 The other Allies, along with NATO Secretary General Paul-Henri 
Spaak, were outraged at the French proposal.  In addition to envisaging the three-nation 
directorate as a body superior to the Alliance, de Gaulle also threatened to make France’s 
continued support of NATO contingent on the acceptance of his proposal.75  The 
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directorate proposal was rejected, and despite de Gaulle’s threats, France remained in 
NATO. 
2. Nuclear Issues 
When de Gaulle demanded that a tripartite directorate be established with shared 
control of NATO nuclear policy, France was not yet a nuclear power.  The United States 
also refused to comply with French demands for nuclear weapons technologies.  The 
United States refusal to share, without limitations, its nuclear technology with France 
contributed to fissure within the Alliance.  Specifically, France’s disagreements over 
nuclear weapons focused on three main areas:  1) the proposed stockpiling of nuclear 
weapons in France, which would not be under French control, 2) the installation in 
Europe of Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) launchers, which would be solely 
under US control, and 3) the acquisition of nuclear submarines and related nuclear 
technology.76 Each of these issues was also linked to the tight control over nuclear 
weapons required by United States policy.   
As the United States failed to meet continued French demands for access to US 
nuclear expertise, the French moved with more vigor to acquire their own national 
nuclear weapons capability.77 Specifically, the United States was concerned that a multi-
polar nuclear policy within the Alliance would lead to fissures in cohesion and decision 
making.  The proliferation of nuclear arms within the Alliance would cause a potentially 
destabilizing conundrum, as other countries, especially West Germany, might seek 
nuclear arms.  For France, NATO nuclear policy hindered its pursuit of its own defense 
prerogatives, so that the  
Atlantic alliance makes a sham of our [French] independence … France 
must have the right to participate in the conception and planning of 
nuclear war.  France’s conditions for the deployment of nuclear weapons 
on its territory are in line with what the French governments claim as of 
right:  the weapons must be under French control, and France must be 
involved in the development of nuclear strategy.78   
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In June 1959, the French refused to allow the United States to stockpile nuclear 
weapons in France unless their three conditions were met:  1) the French government had 
to know the locations, nature and amount of the weapons; 2) France had to concur with 
the decision on their use; and 3) the United States had to ensure cooperation in military 
applications of atomic sciences between the United States and France.79  Norway and 
Denmark had also refused the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory, but 
without the conditions set by France.80   De Gaulle also held that France could not rest its 
national survival on the nuclear guarantee of the United States, and therefore to defend its 
sovereignty would pursue a nuclear force de frappe.  Only with its own nuclear capability 
would France again be the master of its own destiny, and NATO was increasingly 
perceived as a hindrance to those pursuits. 
3. The French Withdrawal, 1966 
France detonated its first atomic weapon in February 1960.  From that point on, 
de Gaulle’s policies continued to strain France’s relationship with the United States and 
NATO.  On 7 March 1966 President Johnson received a letter from President de Gaulle 
that declared: 
France considers the changes which have taken place or in process of 
occurring since 1949 in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as evolution 
of her own situation and her own forces no longer justify insofar as that 
concerns her the arrangements of a military nature adopted after the 
conclusion of the alliance, whether in common under the form of 
multilateral conventions or whether by special agreement between the 
French Government and the American Government.  
It is for this reason that France proposes to recover the entire exercise of 
her sovereignty over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent 
presence of allied military elements or by constant utilization which is 
made of her air space, to terminate her participation in "integrated" 
commands and no longer to place her forces at the disposal of NATO. 81 
The letter shocked the Allies, not because it was unexpected, but because the 
threats of withdrawal had continued for so long, that they had lost some of their 
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credibility.  The perception within NATO was that, if France intended to withdraw from 
the Alliance, it would do so in 1969, under the provisions of Article 1382 of the 
Washington Treaty.83 
President de Gaulle’s letter explicitly stated that France intended “from now on to 
remain party to the Treaty signed at Washington on April 4, 1949,” and would remain 
“determined even as today to fight at the side of her allies in case one of them will be the 
object of unprovoked aggression.”84  De Gaulle’s sentiments were echoed by French 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville in April 1966.  According to de Murville, France 
would remain in NATO, and not just until 1969:  
France has made known to her associates, by officially and publicly 
stating to them that she had no intention of availing herself of the clause 
that permits each partner, in 1969, insofar as it is concerned, to terminate 
the alliance; that she intended, on the contrary, to stay in it so long as that 
appeared necessary.85 
France remained committed to the North Atlantic Treaty, but had chosen to 
withdraw from some NATO institutions.  France remained bound by the commitments 
under Article 5.  The institutions were a different matter, because they constituted: 
a whole group of integrated international commands, placed unavoidably 
under the authority of the strongest, by far, of all the partners, which are 
set up in continental Europe, already functioning in peacetime, even if 
they - at that time have no effective responsibilities, and to which are 
assigned, in the event of war, the bulk of the conventional military forces 
… stationed in the western part of the European continent. 86 
In 1964 President de Gaulle remarked that the status of the existing Atlantic relationship 
through the integrated military institutions of NATO made Europe little more “than an 
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American protectorate.” 87  In the end France withdrew from certain NATO institutions, 
but remained dedicated to the Treaty, and was still protected from the Soviet Union by 
the combined military power of NATO. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
The cases presented in this chapter are not separate events, in that each is part of a 
historical continuum.  Certain continuities are apparent regarding NATO and collective 
defense during the Cold War.  The North Atlantic Treaty was created essentially for the 
collective defense provisions of Article 5 as a deterrent and unifying principle against 
Soviet attack.  The same provisions remained essential to each of the Allies throughout 
the Cold War.  From 1949 through 1989, the North Atlantic Treaty was politically 
interpreted in multiple ways, but Article 5 remained sacrosanct.  
West Germany’s membership in NATO illustrates an important political-military 
compromise made to ensure that the Alliance would be able to deter a Soviet invasion.  It 
is significant that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States did not simply 
terminate the occupation regime.  West Germany as a whole was made an equal partner 
in NATO.  To give credibility to NATO’s preparations to defend the Treaty area 
collectively, the Alliance had to: 
Develop ‘forces in being’ in Europe which would be capable of effectively 
contributing to success in the initial phase88 and of preventing the rapid 
overrunning of Europe.  To do this these forces must be highly trained, 
mobile, have an integrated atomic capability* and be properly positioned 
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in depth. In this respect the importance of obtaining a German contribution 
to these forces cannot be too strongly emphasized.89 
In the end, West Germany’s contribution to the common defense through NATO helped 
lessen Franco-German tensions, further increasing the credibility of the Western 
deterrent.     
Flexible response and MC 14/3 serve as a paradigm for NATO consultation.  The 
United States maintained a perception different from that of the European Allies of how 
best to deter Soviet aggression.  However, through consultation, the opposing viewpoints 
converged in a strategy acceptable to both sides. The debate over massive retaliation and 
flexible response reflected the primacy of Article 5, and concerned the most efficacious 
way to ensure that it remained militarily and politically credible.  The Allies sought to 
make certain that in the event of aggression they would have sufficient political and 
military strength to defend the West.   
Deterrence through flexible response met the concerns of the United States and 
most of the other Allies by reaffirming deterrence through threats of nuclear retaliation, 
and by promoting the pragmatic acquisition of improved military capabilities. The 
greatest strength of flexible response was its ability to support the disparate strategic 
interests of the United States and most of the other NATO Allies.  Flexible response 
remained NATO policy during the rest of the Cold War because it permitted a range of 
action and interpretation both strategically and politically.90 
Finally, the French withdrawal from the integrated military structure serves as an 
example of the ultimate primacy of Article 5, even through the discontent of one of the 
primary Allies.  From the Gaullist perspective, NATO increasingly hampered France’s 
pursuit of its national interests.  However, Article 5 embodied the ultimate interest of 
state preservation.  Despite President de Gaulle’s criticisms of the organization, NATO 
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was central to France’s national interest, and France therefore could not withdraw from 
the Washington Treaty.  The overarching threat of the Soviet Union meant that, despite 
national interests, regional predilections, and contrary opinions within the Alliance, the 
defense of Western civilization was at stake.  Since the survival of the nation is the most 
fundamental national interest, collective defense was synonymous with each Ally’s 
national interest. 
Adherence to Article 5 collective defense during the Cold War allowed sovereign 
nations to set aside their political differences and to build upon a shared sense of a 
community of values.  The guarantee of collective action through Article 5 was a means 
to ensure the survival of not only a political system, but also the Western way of life—the 































III. ARTICLE 5 DURING THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD, 9 NOVEMBER 
1989 – 10 SEPTEMBER 2001 
US President George H. W. Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev agreed on 
3 December 1989 while meeting off the coast of Malta that the Cold War was effectively 
over.91  President Gorbachev stated during a press conference that he and President Bush 
believed that “the world leaves one epoch of cold war and enters another epoch. This is 
just the beginning.  We're just at the very beginning of our long road to a long-lasting 
peaceful period.”92  The strategic situation in Europe was fluid from the fall of the Berlin 
wall on 9 November 1989 through the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991.  
These years are the beginning of the post-Cold War period, which was marked with 
multiple adaptations by NATO to address the security challenges affecting its members.  
However, the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 decisively ended the post-Cold War 
period.   US Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated “Not only is the Cold War over, the 
post-Cold War period is also over.”93 
One of the immediate results of the end of the Cold War was a debate on the 
continued relevance of the Atlantic Alliance.  Article 13 of the North Atlantic Treaty 
states:  “After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a 
Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the 
United States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the 
deposit of each notice of denunciation.”94  However, no NATO nation withdrew from the 
Alliance, called for its termination, or questioned its viability during the Cold War.  
Critics of the Alliance, old and new, claimed that the end of the Cold War had 
made NATO outdated.  They argued that it should be replaced by institutions better 
equipped to handle the security challenges of the “new world order.”  The threat for 
which NATO was created had disappeared.  The Western Allies had won the Cold War; 
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and according to some “realist” theories, alliances should not outlive the threat which 
they were created to counter.95   
Among the Alliance members, the French Ambassador to NATO offered the most 
controversial opinion in regard to NATO’s future.  According to Rob de Wijk, the French 
Ambassador argued in behind-the-scenes discussions in the early 1990s that, because of 
the changing security situation, the Alliance would soon collapse. 96  Those who opposed 
the French view pointed to the credible “residual threat” posed by the Soviet Union,97 as 
noted in the 1991 Strategic Concept.  The United States, as well as others, recognized that 
the future of the Alliance could not be tied to the Soviet threat, and instead restated the 
importance of maintaining the trans-Atlantic link and NATO as the representation of a 
shared community of values, a “common heritage and civilization.”98  While the security 
environment remained in flux, many of the Allies hesitated to pursue a clear course 
without the consensus of the “Quad” countries - that is, France, Germany, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States.   
In the end, the obvious institutional benefits of the Alliance were too substantial 
to its members to be wholly discarded.  NATO had served to eliminate the prime source 
of interstate conflict in Europe, the reliance on national defense priorities and policies.99  
Despite its internal differences of opinion about specific policies such as the British and 
French involvement in the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the United States intervention in 
Vietnam, NATO had endured.  In Josef Joffe’s words, it has “impressively discharged the 
three key tasks of an international order:  It has preserved the security and independence 
of its members; it has been stable; and it has muted, if not inhibited, the use of force.”100   
The debate on NATO’s future outlasted the post-Cold War euphoria and the calls 
for its retirement, with the realization that the absence of the Soviet Union did not entail 
ndeed, there is no specific mention of the Soviet Union in the absence of other threats.  I                                                 
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the North Atlantic Treaty, although it was the catalyst for the Treaty’s creation. The 
question for the Alliance in the early 1990s was how to deal with the power vacuum in 
Central and Eastern Europe, which would inevitably affect its members.  NATO had been 
the anchor of peace in Europe for over forty years.  With the collapse of its traditional 
perceived enemy, NATO was forced instead to see that collapse as the greatest danger to 
the security of the Alliance members.101  As the risk of large-scale aggression 
disappeared, there was no longer a need for the institution to focus only on collective 
defense.  “NATO had to transform.  If not, it could die.”102 
A. REAFFIRMATION OF ARTICLE 5  
The fulcrum of Alliance cohesion and strength throughout its first five decades 
was the collective defense commitment formulated in Article 5 of the North Atlantic 
Treaty, which states that “An armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or 
North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”103  
Because of the tumult and confusion during the outset of the post-Cold War 
period, or the “long decade” from 9 November 1989 to 10 September 2001, it was 
important for the Alliance to reaffirm its commitment to the primacy of collective 
defense.  The 1990 London Declaration was the first Alliance document to do so; it 
asserted that NATO was “the most successful defensive alliance in history,” and that it 
“must continue to provide for the common defence.”104  The same position was echoed 
throughout the “decade” in other major Alliance policies and documents.  NATO’s 1991 
Strategic Concept, envisaged as its policy in a Europe with a non-adversarial Soviet 
Union, acknowledged that the new environment did not “change the purpose or the 
security functions of the Alliance, but rather underlines their enduring validity.”105 
Additionally, the Strategic Concept restated the importance of Article 5, noting that “The 
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security of all Allies is indivisible:  an attack on one is an attack on all.”106  Along with 
the 1991 Rome Declaration, the 1991 Strategic Concept proclaimed NATO’s centrality as 
the guarantor of European security and stability through Article 5.107 
 Although there was evidently little chance of a large-scale attack against an Ally 
by any nation or group of nations after the collapse of the Soviet empire, collective 
defense remained the critical foundation for the Atlantic Alliance.  Article 5 continued as 
a binding element of Alliance consensus, which provided a basic and common point for 
all consultation.   It was vital for the Allies to maintain the political, military and resource 
advantages that make collective defense possible.  Alliance military capabilities, 
combined with political unity and the will to act, guaranteed that no form of aggression or 
coercion against any member would be seen as acceptable or would have a chance of 
enduring success.  Additionally, owing in part to the leadership provided by the United 
States, the Alliance prevented the re-nationalization of defense policy without adversely 
affecting the sovereignty or security of its members.  Similarly, sharing to a significant 
extent the burden of collective defense prevented the rise of adversarial relationships 
between members of the Alliance (with the noteworthy exception of Greek-Turkish 
interactions).  NATO has provided a forum for the peaceful settlement of disputes and for 
consultations on all security matters under Article 4.108 
Article 5, as the bedrock principle of cohesion, allowed NATO to distinguish 
itself from historical alliances through the construction of operational norms in 
peacetime.  NATO nations developed a structure of “common institutions, joint rules of 
working together and standard operating procedures … [W]ithin the Alliance framework 
certain habits of collaboration among member states … developed which have proved to 
be mutually rewarding.”109  The institution created a powerful incentive for participating 
governments to continue practices that have led to a high degree of stability and 
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prosperity.  Furthermore, the model of NATO cooperation and Western community stood 
as an attractive goal for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe, and could be used by 
the Alliance as a mechanism to contribute to regional stability.  
Finally, the 2001 edition of the NATO Handbook also reaffirmed the significance 
of the mutual-defense pledge of Article 5: “the task of providing security through 
deterrence and collective defense remains unchanged.”110   
In summation, NATO remained a collective defense organization, dedicated to the 
“magnetic core”111 of Article 5, throughout the entire post-Cold War period.   Collective 
defense continued as NATO’s first and foremost means of deterrence against aggression 
in order to prevent wars before they start, so that the Alliance does not have to make and 
keep the peace after they stop.112   Article 5 is a legitimate means of deterring aggression.  
It helps to explain why “Europe today is more peaceful, less divided and more 
democratic than at any time in the modern era.”113 
B. OUT-OF-AREA/NON-ARTICLE 5 OPERATIONS  
Even though NATO continued to assert the principle of collective defense 
throughout the post-Cold War period, preparations for conducting Article 5 missions 
were downgraded during the 1990s, and the Alliance focused its efforts on non-Article 5 
activities in support of collective security outside the Treaty Area defined by Article 6.114  
The threat of a third world war between East and West was symbolically eliminated when 
NATO proposed a “joint declaration” by the Alliance and the Warsaw Pact countries.  
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The declaration would state that the NATO and Warsaw Treaty Organization states were 
“no longer adversaries,” and would reaffirm their intention to “refrain from the threat or 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”115  
The Allies agreed, however, that threats still existed.  Security challenges in the new 
international environment could result from myriad factors. As the Allies noted in the 
1991 Strategic Concept:  
Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression 
against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse 
consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, 
social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial 
disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. 
The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not 
directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the 
Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European 
stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers 
or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of 
the Alliance.116 
NATO’s 1991 Security Concept listed some of the potential threats as “risks of a 
wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the 
flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”117  Furthermore, 
arrangements existed “within the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under 
Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, [for] coordination of their 
efforts including their responses to such risks.”118  To counter these new security risks, 
beginning in 1992 NATO increasingly undertook non-Article 5 operations as part of a 
new approach, which, along with cooperation and dialogue, sought to promote stability 
throughout the Euro-Atlantic region. 
The Alliance viewed its role within a “broad approach to security,”119 which 
allowed it to successfully “manage crises affecting the security of the Allies.”120 Non-
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Article 5 missions were seen as a military corollary to the Alliance's policies of 
preserving peace and preventing war.  In the new security environment, these policies 
depended all the more on “the effectiveness of preventive diplomacy and successful 
management of crises affecting the security of its members.”  The goal of new operations 
was to interdict crises in their earliest stages, before they could spread, and prevent their 
escalation.   
Beginning in June 1992, NATO pursued a policy begun with the Strategic 
Concept of 1991: actively engaging in political-military actions not covered under Article 
5.  Non-Article 5 missions included, “on a case-by-case basis in accordance with our own 
procedures, peacekeeping activities under the responsibility of the CSCE, including by 
making available Alliance resources and expertise.”121  The Alliance established a policy 
of voluntary participation in non-Article 5 operations.  That is, each Ally chooses 
whether to participate in a peacekeeping mission.  A coalition of willing participants then 
forms for each contingency.  This approach recognized that each Ally had distinct 
security concerns and interests, as well as variegated military capabilities.  Moreover, 
NATO itself could decide whether and how to deal with each security contingency.  
Therefore, the new missions paved the way for European-led crisis management that did 
not militarily rely on the United States.    
NATO further defined non-Article 5 missions at the meeting of Ministers of 
Defense at Brussels on 25-26 May 1993, where the NAC firmly declared its commitment 
to crisis management inside and outside the NATO area.122  Non-Article 5 missions were 
now also referred to as out-of-area operations, with respect to Article 6 of the North 
Atlantic Treaty. 
The pursuit of non-Article 5 missions, referred to in NATO as “peace keeping,” 
“crisis management,” or “peace-support operations,” was not initially unanimously 
supported by the Allies.  France, for instance, desired that NATO remain primarily an 
institution for collective defense, and argued that the new non-Article 5 missions should 
be the responsibility of more European institutions, such as the Western European Union 
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(WEU), the CSCE/OCSE, or the European Union (EU).  This concept persisted and, 
along with other factors, led France and the United Kingdom to jointly propose that the 
EU develop “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, 
the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to 
international crises.”123  In December 1999, at the Helsinki Summit of the European 
Union, the 15 EU members decided to acquire a capability to deploy 60,000 troops, 
within two months, for up to one year.  The new European Rapid Reaction Force would 
conduct operations in support of the Petersberg Tasks:    
Apart from contributing to the common defense in accordance with Article 
5 of the Washington Treaty and Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty 
respectively, military units of the WEU member States, acting under the 
Authority of the WEU, could be employed for: 
1) Humanitarian and Rescue Tasks, 
2) Peacekeeping Tasks 
3) Tasks of combat forces involving crisis management, including 
peacemaking.124  
Germany had inherent difficulties in adapting to the new mission area.  Article 
87a of the Constitution, or Basic law, of the Federal Republic of Germany, amended in 
1956 to permit the establishment of the Bundeswehr, states that “The Federation 
establishes Armed Forces for defense purposes.”125  However, Article 24, paragraph 2, of 
the Basic law provides that “For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a 
system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon 
its rights of sovereignty as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in 
Europe and among the nations of the world.”126  There is enough vagueness in the two 
statements to allow for debate between opposing parties within the German political 
system as to the appropriate manner of employment of the German armed forces outside 
Germany’s borders.   
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By the mid-1980s, a “cross-party consensus had formed” that the Bundeswehr 
could not be employed apart from the defense of Germany and its allies.  However, the 
1991 Gulf War recast the debate on Germany’s role in operations outside its Alliance 
obligations.  The debate was not resolved immediately, but Germany did provide vital 
logistical support for the coalition’s military build-up in the Middle East, and contributed 
over DM 18 Billion in capital and services to the United Nations coalition efforts. 127 
Volker Ruhe, then the Secretary of the Christian Democratic Union, was quoted in Der 
Spiegel as saying that “the Gulf War casts a bright light on the need to redefine united 
Germany’s international role, particularly insofar as our readiness to commit our forces 
beyond the NATO area is concerned.”128  The Christian Democratic Union and the 
Christian Social Union, two major German political parties, developed the currently 
prevailing view that participation in out-of-area military operations by the Bundeswehr is 
permissible under the auspices of multilateral institutions such as NATO, the WEU, and 
the United Nations, but never unilaterally.129 
Some of the militarily weaker Allies also had reservations about committing 
troops to new mission  areas.  Each desired the protection offered by Article 5, but many 
also wished to cut military expenditures and responsibilities, taking advantage of the 
post-Cold War  “peace dividend.”  Over the course of the decade, some European 
countries reduced their armed forces by almost half.  The Netherlands, in particular, 
abolished an independent army corps and formed one in conjunction with Germany.130 
In 1997, in conjunction with the negotiation of the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act,131 NATO decided to reexamine its Strategic Concept and update it to “reflect the 
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changes that had taken place in Europe since its adoption.”132  These changes included 
the fall of the Soviet Union, the decision to enlarge NATO’s membership, and the 
enhanced role of the Alliance in crisis management.  The 1999 Washington Summit 
Communiqué stated that NATO’s purposes in Euro-Atlantic security included:  
To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against any NATO 
member state as provided for in Articles 5 and 6 of the Washington 
Treaty.  And in order to enhance the security and stability of the Euro-
Atlantic area … To stand ready, case-by-case and by consensus, in 
conformity with Article 7 of the Washington Treaty, to contribute to 
effective conflict prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, 
including crisis response operations.133  
The new Strategic Concept proclaimed that NATO had indeed “successfully 
adapted to enhance its ability to contribute to Euro-Atlantic peace and stability” 134 in the 
post-Cold War period.  Article 5 was again reaffirmed, but the Strategic Concept placed 
NATO’s security interests in a wider context.  The security challenges had been further 
refined: 
Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, 
including acts of terrorism, sabotage and organised crime, and by the 
disruption of the flow of vital resources. The uncontrolled movement of 
large numbers of people, particularly as a consequence of armed conflicts, 
can also pose problems for security and stability affecting the Alliance.135  
In future crises, NATO would seek cooperation with other organizations to 
prevent conflict and/or contribute to its effective management through non-Article 5 
operations.  By being prepared to undertake non-Article 5 tasks NATO further reinforced 
its commitment to extend stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region.136  The true 
evidence of NATO’s commitment came with its 78-day air campaign against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia in 1999 and with Operation Essential Harvest in the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in August-September 2001.  Moreover, NATO has 
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remained active in the Balkans through the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, and Operation Amber Fox in the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. 
1.  Article 5 By Other Means 
Through non-Article 5 operations, preventive crisis management, and cooperation 
with former adversaries and other non-NATO countries, the Alliance attempted to 
achieve “collective defense by other means”—that is, means other than mutual defense 
pledges backed by military forces.137  Active political-military involvement by NATO 
and its partners contributed to the promotion of stability along the periphery of Europe 
and among former adversaries.  Through broader and more productive bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation, in all realms of European security, the aim of the Allies was: 
preventing crises or, should they arise, ensuring their effective 
management. Such partnership between the members of the Alliance and 
other nations in dealing with specific problems will be an essential factor 
in moving beyond past divisions towards one Europe whole and free. This 
policy of cooperation is the expression of the inseparability of security 
among European states. It is built upon a common recognition among 
Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social 
divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such 
divisions must thus be diminished.138 
Actions within the broader concept of security would be undertaken by Allies, 
Partners, and other non-NATO countries outside of the Partnership for Peace.139  One of 
the beneficial elements was reassurance.  Through various institutional arrangements, 
NATO could maintain transparency, and reassure Partners and other non-NATO nations 
of the security of their sovereignty and interests, as well as of the steadfastness of 
NATO’s commitments.  Collective defense by other means is not de facto Article 5 
protection for non-signatories of the North Atlantic Treaty.  The Partnership for Peace 
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includes a commitment by the NATO Allies to consult with any partner that perceives a 
threat to its security.  
2.  Peripheral Article 5 
Even though Article 5 was constantly reaffirmed, the model for collective defense 
action had to be adapted to the new security environment.  The threat of a Soviet-led 
invasion declined in 1989, and disappeared in December 1991.  Subsequently, NATO 
found itself the dominant military force in Europe (if not globally).  The focus for 
possible Article 5 contingencies relocated from Central Europe to NATO’s periphery in 
the Middle East, the Caucasus, the Mediterranean, and Southeastern Europe.  According 
to David Yost, “In contrast with the Cold War, when the main planning contingency was 
a massive Soviet-led Warsaw Pact assault against NATO as a whole, future collective 
defense contingencies might involve aggression by a ‘rogue’ state, perhaps in North 
Africa or the Middle East, against only a single NATO ally.”140   In any of these regions, 
a threat of conflict or an attack against a single Ally could become a “limited regional 
conflict” 141 that could escalate into an Article 5 contingency.   
NATO sought to “maintain peaceful and non- adversarial relations with the 
countries in the Southern Mediterranean and Middle East,” and recognized that “The 
stability and peace of the countries on the southern periphery of Europe are important for 
the security of the Alliance.”142  In order to promote these objectives, NATO founded 
two programs to specifically deal with peripheral circumstances, the Mediterranean 
Dialogue and South East Europe Initiative.  
NATO’s South East Europe Initiative specifically targeted instability in the 
Balkans, an area with three concurrent Alliance military stabilization missions, SFOR, 
KFOR and Essential Harvest/Amber Fox.  The Alliance members obligated themselves 
“to take measures to ensure that crises do not destabilise neighbouring countries,” 143 and 
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spillover into other states in the area.  The desire to curtail spillover effects was vital for 
NATO’s interest in the Balkans since the region is “geographically sandwiched by one 
NATO member in the north (Hungary) and three in the south (Greece, Italy and 
Turkey)."144 The Mediterranean Dialogue, begun in 1994, includes NATO, Algeria, 
Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.  The aim of the program is to 
create “good relations and better mutual understanding throughout the Mediterranean,” as 
well as to promote “regional security and stability.”145  The countries involved in these 
two programs are directly concerned with the security of the sub-regions along NATO’s 
periphery.  Specifically, the targeted regions are areas in which instability could escalate 
into a limited regional conflict if initially unchecked.  Additionally, Egypt, Jordan and 
Morocco participate in the Alliance’s Stabilization Force in Bosnia-Herzegovina,146 and 
Jordan and Morocco are also involved the NATO-led force in Kosovo,147 which further 
emphasizes the importance the Alliance places on multilateral forward engagement. 
The 1990-91 Gulf War is an example of a possible regional contingency involving 
a NATO Ally and collective defense concerns.  As events matured in the Middle East, 
NATO became concerned with the possibility of a collective defense contingency in its 
southern region.  Sharing a border with Iraq, and providing bases for coalition aircraft 
and command elements, Turkey could have easily become a target of Iraqi military 
action.148  Hypothetically, Iraq could have employed or threatened tactics similar to its 
SCUD missile strikes against Israel, with the hope of politically separating members of 
the coalition.  Iraq did not attack Turkey, however, and therefore Article 5 invocation was 
not required.  NATO did signal its commitment to Turkey’s defense by planning for a 
possible Iraqi attack.149  If an attack had occurred, even though Operation Desert Storm 
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was not a NATO mission, the NATO Allies would have become involved in a 
subregional contingency covered under Article 5.   
3. Article 5 and Out-of-Area Interaction 
There is a degree of vagueness associated with the differentiation between Article 
5 and non-Article 5 missions.  First, due to a lack of resolve or will to act, the avoidance 
of a non-Article 5 mission could lead to an Article 5 contingency.  Since NATO’s new 
strategy favored the prevention of conflict, minor instabilities should not be allowed to 
ferment and erupt into major challenges to the security of the Allies.  As stated, these new 
challenges could come from many factors, including terrorism, refugee flows, organized 
crime, and other trans-border security challenges.  In other words: “To prevent the 
Bosnias of the future, the NATO alliance conducts a strategy of cooperation and dialogue 
… Forward-engaged military forces … offer political leaders the kind of flexibility and 
options that make it possible to deal with unstable situations early, before they 
mushroom.”150  Through cooperative security actions, the Alliance could respond to a 
crisis before it becomes an Article 5 threat, so that “lower-risk and lower-cost collective 
security missions may help the Allies avoid mounting higher-risk and higher-cost 
collective defense operations.”151 
Second, a non-Article 5 action could escalate into an Article 5 contingency. 152  
Such a scenario could have arisen as part of the Alliance’s activities in Bosnia-
Herzegovina in 1992-1995.  If forces from NATO nations operating under United 
Nations auspices had come under attack, the Allies might have considered such an attack 
grounds for an Article 5 invocation.153   
Additionally, since crisis management operations would be conducted by 
coalitions of the willing, if a crisis rapidly escalated into an Article 5 contingency, the 
Allies that had attempted originally to abstain from military commitment could be drawn 
into the conflict.  The fact that different Allies are in different “zones of security” 
complicates this matter.  Luxembourg remains in a zone of relative safety, protected 
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through Article 5, and is not likely to be militarily involved with crisis management.  
Conversely, Turkey resides in a zone of “maximum danger,” bordering on the unstable 
Middle East and the Caucasus.154  A possible scenario could involve a conflict between 
Turkey and Syria over access to the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers.  A 
disagreement could lead to non-Article 5 peacekeeping, and Luxembourg and Canada, 
for instance, would have to decide whether participation in this peacekeeping operation 
was consistent with their national interests.  If the scenario evolved into an attack by 
Syria on Turkish territory, those same Allies could be obligated to offer assistance under 
Article 5. 
The situation becomes more muddled when one considers that the language of 
Article 5 only covers the Treaty area illuminated in Article 6.  Article 5 states that it 
pertains to attacks against one or more Allies “in Europe or North America.” Article 6 is 
clear that its delineation of the Treaty area is “for the purpose of Article 5.”  One issue 
that has not been resolved is whether Alliance forces involved in a non-Article 5 
operation outside the Treaty area would be covered under the collective defense 
provisions.155 
A definitive differentiation between Article 5 and non-Article 5 actions may not 
be possible in view of the uncertainties discussed above.  Lack of clear demarcation is 
one of the prime reasons for NATO’s retention of a single military system, which is able 
to handle the command and control requirements of both mission types.  It was clear to 
the allies in the 1990s that the new command structure should not be just for coalitions of 
the willing in crisis management operations, but also for Article 5 operations.156   The 
debate was concluded in 1995 by the new Ministerial Guidance, which indicated that 
collective defense planning had to be directed at all of the Alliance’s military tasks, 
including non-Article 5 operations.157   
The awareness that a peripheral crisis involving an Ally, or the forces of several 
Allies, might spillover into Allied territory prompted some of the non-peripheral Allies to 
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strengthen their strategic mobility capabilities, in order to adapt their armed forces to the 
types of operations they might be tasked to accomplish.158  Additionally, NATO 
organized the ARRC (Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) as the land 
component of the ACE Rapid Reaction Forces. Its role is to be prepared for employment 
throughout Allied Command Europe (ACE) to augment or reinforce local forces 
whenever necessary. Its peacetime planning structure includes 10 assigned divisions plus 
core troops from 14 NATO nations, allowing a rapid response to a wide range of 
eventualities.159   
The maintenance of an adequate military capability and clear preparedness 
to act collectively therefore remain central [for NATO]. The structures and 
arrangements which have been built over many years enable member 
countries to benefit from the political, military and resource advantages of 
collective action and collective defence.160 
4.  Non-Article 5 Difficulties 
Out-of-area concerns have gestated within NATO since its inception in 1949, 
when the United States desired to avoid involvement in the colonial intrigues of its 
European partners.161  Less than twenty years later, the Europeans revisited the issue, as 
they avoided participation in America’s entanglement in Vietnam.  Presently, NATO has 
commitments to Article 5 collective defense and to out-of-area collective security—the 
latter on an ad hoc and selective basis.  The dangers for the Alliance are inaction and 
over-commitment.  Inaction could threaten the credibility of the Alliance, whereas over-
commitment could lessen its ability to deal effectively with crises.  Multiple tasks and 
differing interests could strain consensus and resources.  As a result, in some 
circumstances the conduct of non-Article 5 operations could have a fracturing effect on 
the Alliance, and lead to internal discord.162  Three issues should be highlighted in this 
regard. 
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First, one of the primary principles of NATO’s non-Article 5 crisis management 
endeavors is that they are conducted by coalitions of willing Allies, Partners and other 
non-NATO countries, with the concurrence of the North Atlantic Council.  No 
automaticity of action is required from any of the Allies.  The level of perceived 
obligation and interest guides each Ally in each specific contingency.  Furthermore, the 
parties could choose to defend the security of an Ally or Partner that had chosen not to 
participate in the operation itself.  Abstention from action by one or more Allies could 
place an unequal burden on those participating in the coalition, and participating Allies 
could end up defending the security interests of non-participating ones. 
Second, there are different security zones and threat perceptions within the 
Alliance.  A country in the most secure zone may not judge that its vital interests would 
be served by assisting in an operation against limited aggression.163  Divergent 
perceptions of interest could create “free riders,”164 which might only symbolically 
contribute to the management of a burgeoning crisis, in effect “holding the coats” of 
those participating. 165   
Third, those who aspire to become NATO Allies, including the nine participants 
in the Membership Action Plan (MAP),166 desire the security offered under Article 5.  
This is no surprise since these nations have been caught between the major powers of 
Europe throughout the modern era, serving as pawns in each iteration of the balance of 
power.  However, in some circumstances they may be less likely to participate in non-
Article 5 missions, preferring to allot resources toward economic and social programs, 
despite their current contributions to SFOR and KFOR.  President Lennart Meri of 
Estonia, speaking in 1998, said that Article 5 is the “strongest statement of unity that the 
Western community can give, demanding in return only sensible, low-profile behavior, 
logical for a member of the defense union.”167  In the debate over new accessions to the 
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Alliance, the positions held regarding Article 5 by the aspirant countries might serve as 
an indicator of the seriousness of the candidates with respect to Alliance commitments.   
Do the aspirants wish to enjoy the “strong statement of unity,” but once members, to 
maintain a “low profile”? 
In practical terms, none of these problems is entirely new.  Since its inception, 
NATO has consisted of variegated states, each with different perceptions of national 
interests and security requirements.  In 1952, the question was not whether Denmark 
would defend Turkey from Iraq, but if Norway would defend Greece from the USSR, or 
vice versa.168  The terms have altered, but the debate remains the same.  Additionally, 
even though there were disagreements about the manner in which NATO handled its 
three main non-Article 5 operations in the 1990s—Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo and the 
Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—the Alliance maintained sufficient consensus 
and resolve to not only conduct the missions, but also to create a foundation in each 
country for long-term peace and stability.  In each case dissension was noted, but 
compromise was always achieved and consensus maintained.  Greece was a key example 
during the burgeoning Kosovo crisis.  The Greek populace felt a sense of solidarity with 
the Orthodox church members in Serbia, and was adamantly opposed to the NATO 
operation.169  However, while the Greek government reported its disagreement and 
refused to allow Allied operations to originate from Greece, it did not hamstring action in 
the North Atlantic Council.   
As for the “free-rider” issue, the Alliance has always included Allies less 
militarily capable than others.  It is not the issue that Iceland has no military forces, or 
that Luxembourg maintains only 900 troops organized into a light infantry battalion and 
two reconnaissance companies,170 but that each Ally maintains its commitment to defend 
the security interests of the others, as per the Washington Treaty. 
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C. CONCLUSION  
By the turn of the new century, reports of NATO’s demise had surely been 
exaggerated.  The Alliance had lived up to its own billing:  it had remained committed to 
collective defense, had successfully transformed itself into a body capable of non-Article 
5 missions, had created mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation with former 
adversaries, had enlarged its membership to 19, had concluded agreements on special 
working relationships with Russia and Ukraine, and had brought dozens of countries 
under its umbrella of stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region. 171  In doing so, 
NATO clearly established itself as the lead source of military and diplomatic security for 
the entire region and its periphery, not just its 19 members.  
Throughout the long decade of the 1990s, NATO engaged in a two-track policy:  
it pursued collective security aspirations, while maintaining its core commitment to the 
collective defense of the allies.172  NATO’s statements and actions during the period 
affirmed that it remained an institution based on collective defense, but that it had been 
transformed into a vehicle, on a case-by-case basis, for interventions in support of 
collective security in the Euro-Atlantic region.173  “Collective defense remains the only 
solid foundation for Alliance cohesion and strength, and the most reliable basis for 
undertaking selected operations in support of collective security.”174  However, Alliance 
strategy was modified “as NATO’s focus shifted from the imperatives of collective 
defense within the red-blue confines of the Cold War to the more gray regions of 
collective security.”175  The bottom line is that “NATO originated as, and remains a 
collective defense organization,” even though it has been adapted to perform collective 
security functions.176  According to the 1999 Strategic Concept:  
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The primary role of Alliance military forces is to protect peace and to 
guarantee the territorial integrity, political independence and security of 
member states. The Alliance's forces must therefore be able to deter and 
defend effectively, to maintain or restore the territorial integrity of Allied 
nations and - in case of conflict - to terminate war rapidly by making an 
aggressor reconsider his decision, cease his attack and withdraw. NATO 
forces must maintain the ability to provide for collective defence while 
conducting effective non-Article 5 crisis response operations.177  
In other words, collective defense under Article 5 has remained valid, as a hedge against 
unforeseen aggression against the Alliance or a single Ally, as a basis for the Alliance’s 
internal functions, and as a means to pursue collective security functions.178 
By adhering to the core commitment of Article 5, the Alliance has been able to 
transform its security environment.  With the Alliance’s borders secure, security could 
then be extended to non-Allies.  In the new security environment a traditional Article 5 
contingency seemed to be less likely to occur.  The Alliance could therefore undertake 
non-Article 5 actions that upheld its new missions, and that strengthened security for the 
Allies and for Europe as a whole.  NATO had always declared that “The security of all 
Allies is indivisible,”179 but with its new interest in promoting security beyond the 
collective defense of its members, it boldly asserted that “security is indivisible.”180  The 
difference in language is subtle, but poignant in meaning.  The assertion that “the security 
of all Allies is indivisible” is a call to Article 5 collective defense.  However, with the 
statement that security itself is indivisible, NATO’s security aspirations went beyond 
Article 6 borders and extended to the entire Euro-Atlantic community. 
Underlying the changes themselves, in addition to the requirements dictated by 
the Alliance's new roles, two indispensable principles have remained sacrosanct: the 
commitment to collective defense as a core function which is fundamental to the 
Alliance, and the preservation and maintenance of the transatlantic link as the guarantor 
of the Alliance's credibility and effectiveness.181  Surviving through transformation, and 
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despite claims about its ineffectiveness and forecasts of its eventual demise, NATO yet 
“remains the single most effective institution for combining the political-military assets 
of the major Western powers, and its effectiveness must be preserved – for collective 
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IV. ARTICLE 5 SINCE 11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
A.        NATO AND TERRORISM, PRE-11 SEPTEMBER 2001 
The September 2001 attacks on the United States were the first major aggression 
against a NATO member since the founding of the Alliance.  The attack differed from 
existing NATO concepts of probable attacks on an Ally.  Although terrorism had not 
been perceived as a probable form of an Article 5 attack, by 12 September the NAC had 
invoked Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.  Furthermore, it should be noted that, 
while the attack was on the territory of the United States, it affected several of the NATO 
Allies.  In addition to the US losses, approximately 334 citizens of other NATO countries 
perished in the 11 September attacks on the World Trade Center alone.183 
Throughout the Cold War, NATO had viewed terrorism within a threat continuum 
dominated by concerns about Soviet endeavors.  Because the Soviets could not risk 
actions that might lead to a general nuclear war, they might  
initiate operations with limited objectives, such as infiltrations, incursions 
or hostile local actions in the NATO area, covertly or overtly supported by 
themselves, trusting that the Allies in their collective desire to prevent a 
general conflict would either limit their reactions accordingly or not react 
at all.184 
With the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the decline of the Soviet 
Union, terrorism became an explicit concern of Alliance security policy as one of the 
“risks of a wider nature”185 addressed in the 1991 Strategic Concept.  Both the 1991 and 
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1999 Strategic Concepts redefined NATO’s outlook on terrorism within the Alliance.  
terrorism.  The post-Cold War Security Concepts set terrorism within a broad approach to 
security that attempted, in the absence of a major Soviet-type threat, to spread democracy 
and stability throughout the Euro-Atlantic area.  The new threats to NATO were to be 
dealt with through the provisions of Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty,186 which 
would allow the Allies to “address broader challenges in our consultations and in the 
appropriate multilateral forums in the widest possible cooperation with other states.”187 
During the post-Cold War reorientation of threats and security concepts, terrorism 
was identified as a threat, but not as a likely source of an Article 5 contingency.  Instead, 
as discussed in the previous chapter, within the realm of Article 5 operations, NATO was 
preoccupied with the possibility of the escalation of non-Article 5 operations, and the risk 
of attacks on the periphery of the North Atlantic Treaty area.  NATO’s main efforts to 
counter terrorism were through its counter-proliferation initiatives, specifically the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Centre.  Biological, chemical or nuclear weapons 
proliferation by states or non-state actors, including terrorists, could conceivably threaten 
either an Ally or a Partnership for Peace member.188  Such an attack could have 
conceivably led to an Article 5 operation, but most of NATO’s official statements 
reaffirmed that terrorism was one of the wider risks to security, appropriately dealt with 
through the Alliance’s consultative mechanisms.  The Alliance affirmed “the importance 
of arrangements existing in the Alliance for consultation among the Allies under Article 4 
of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, coordination of our efforts including 
our responses to such risks.”189 
1.  The Invocation of Article 5 
The North Atlantic Council met for an emergency session almost immediately 
following the 11 September attacks on the United States.  Within hours the NAC released 
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a statement announcing that “The NATO nations unanimously condemn these barbaric 
acts committed against a NATO member state.”190 Furthermore, the NAC avowed that 
“the United States can rely on its 18 Allies in North America and Europe for assistance 
and support.”191   
On 12 September, the NAC issued the first-ever invocation of Article 5, subject to 
a caveat.  The Council agreed that “if it is determined that this attack was directed from 
abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of 
the Washington Treaty, which states that an armed attack against one or more of the 
Allies in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all.”192  It 
was necessary to qualify the invocation because of the possibility of the attacks 
originating domestically in the United States.  In 1995, some observers wondered 
whether Article 5 might be invoked following the truck-bombing of the Murrah building 
in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.  However, despite initial suspicions, the Oklahoma City 
bombing was not an act of international terrorism, and therefore, not subject to the 
Washington Treaty. 
On 2 October 2001 the United States briefed the NAC with information pertaining 
to the origin and nature of the attacks.  Following the briefing, the NAC agreed that it 
“has been clearly determined that the individuals who carried out the attacks belonged to 
the world-wide terrorist network of Al-Qaida, headed by Osama bin Laden and protected 
by the Taleban regime in Afghanistan.”193  Subsequently, the Alliance affirmed without 
qualification that Article 5 did pertain to the attacks on the United States.   
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty has remained the foundation of the Alliance 
during the Cold War and post-Cold War periods.  The commitment entered into by 12 
nations in 1949, under severely different circumstances, has remained equally legitimate 
in the face of a new threat against 19 nations.  The decision to invoke Article 5 without 
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qualification and under an entirely new set of circumstances—divergent from the original 
concept of likely collective defense contingencies—demonstrated that the ideals of the 
Atlantic Alliance remained valid, and that NATO stood as an active and relevant 
institution, dedicated to democratic values.194 
B.   ARTICLE 5 ACTIONS  
Article 5 does not mandate that automatic or comprehensive aid be offered in the 
defense of the attacked Ally.  Rather, the Washington Treaty states that the Allies must 
be in agreement that an armed attack against another Party has occurred.  Once the 
determination is made—as it was on 2 October—each Ally individually decides to take 
“forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems 
necessary.”195  Assistance can conceivably be in multiple forms, “including the use of 
armed force,” that are deemed necessary.196  Therefore the assistance given depends on 
the economic, political and military resources of the individual Allies. 
1.   Eight Requested Measures 
On 4 October 2001 the United States requested eight measures of support from 
the Allies.  The measures requested under the authority of Article 5 were specifically 
designed to support at the United States’ effort to pursue its campaign against terrorism. 
The Allies agreed to:    
1) enhance intelligence sharing and co-operation, both bilaterally and in 
the appropriate NATO bodies, relating to the threats posed by terrorism 
and the actions to be taken against it;  
2)  provide, individually or collectively, as appropriate and according to 
their capabilities, assistance to Allies and other states which are or may be 
subject to increased terrorist threats as a result of their support for the 
campaign against terrorism:  
3)  take necessary measures to provide increased security for facilities of 
the United States and other Allies on their territory;  
4)  backfill selected Allied assets in NATO’s area of responsibility that are 
required to directly support operations against terrorism;  
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5)  provide blanket overflight clearances for the United States and other 
Allies’ aircraft, in accordance with the necessary air traffic arrangements 
and national procedures, for military flights related to operations against 
terrorism;  
6)  provide access for the United States and other Allies to ports and 
airfields on the territory of NATO nations for operations against terrorism, 
including for refuelling, in accordance with national procedures.  
The North Atlantic Council also agreed: 
7)  that the Alliance is ready to deploy elements of its Standing Naval 
Forces to the Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide a NATO presence 
and demonstrate resolve; and  
8)  that the Alliance is similarly ready to deploy elements of its NATO 
Airborne Early Warning force to support operations against terrorism.197  
All of the Allies agreed unequivocally to implement all eight measures, which 
essentially “operationalized” Article 5.  As a result of the requested measures Alliance 
assets were deployed for the first time to support an Article 5 invocation.  The unanimity 
of decision demonstrated Alliance “solidarity and resolve” to uphold the general 
commitments of the Alliance.198  Additionally, specific Allies have supported the United 
States on a bilateral basis, outside of the NATO framework.  
The NAC met on 8 October 2001, following the commencement of attacks on the 
Taliban regime and the Al-Qaida terrorist network in Afghanistan by forces of the United 
States and United Kingdom, to reaffirm its full support of the US-led military action.  All 
of the Allies remained completely committed to the eight measures, with no defections or 
open disagreement, and several Allies asserted that they were standing ready to receive 
further calls for assistance by the United States. 
2.   NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Force 
The United States requested, under Measure 8, that NATO be “ready to deploy 
elements of its NATO Airborne Early Warning force” to assist in operations against 
terrorism aimed at the United States.  On 8 October 2001 the NAC agreed to deploy five 
NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System) aircraft and their crews to the 
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United States to assist with domestic counter-terrorism operations.  The deployment of 
Operation Eagle Assist “is the first time NATO assets will have been used in direct 
support of the continental United States.”199  In support of the deployment, French 
AWACS assets, not a part of NATO’s integrated military forces, are providing coverage 
in the Balkans to replace the aircraft sent to the United States.200   
The deployment of five aircraft from the NATO Airborne Early Warning and 
Control (NAEW&C) Force allowed “US aircraft currently engaged in these operations in 
the United States to be released for operations against terrorism elsewhere.”201  Each of 
the aircraft was deployed to Tinker Air Force Base, Oklahoma, under the tactical 
command of the North American Air Defense Command (NORAD).202  The aircrews of 
the NAEW&C Force are composed of personnel from 12 Allies.  As of 10 October 2001, 
the national composition of the deployment to the United States consisted of:  Belgium-
11, Canada-22, Denmark-1, Germany-55, Greece-1, Italy-11, the Netherlands-7, Norway-
5, Portugal-2, Spain-2, Turkey-5, and the United States-74.203   
Several operational considerations have evolved since the aircraft began to 
conduct flight operations out of Oklahoma.  The NAEW&C Force was deployed to 
conduct air surveillance and to free up US assets for deployment to Southwest Asia.  
Additionally, three US officers have been delegated the authority from President Bush to 
engage potential adversarial aircraft that threaten the United States.  The NATO AWACS 
are part of the command and control system that would react to any hostile aircraft within 
United States airspace.  Therefore a robust command and control arrangement had to be 
organized and implemented.  The involvement of non-US officers in the engagement and 
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possible shoot-down of a civilian aircraft would have strong legal and political 
ramifications on both sides of the Atlantic.  Accordingly, to clarify the decision-making 
process, the surveillance by NATO aircraft and officers must follow strict operational 
procedures.  Moreover, the aircrews and aircraft involved in the NAEW&C Force 
conduct general surveillance missions instead of command and control204—unlike the US 
aircraft of the same type.  Surveillance missions generally do not involve the aircrews in 
the decision-making role of an air engagement.  Therefore, the NAEW&C Force is 
uniquely capable of assisting with air surveillance over the United States, and any direct 
involvement in the engagement of a civilian aircraft is most unlikely. 
On 16 January 2002 NATO announced that two additional components of the 
NAEW&C Force would be deployed to the United States as further “visible examples of 
NATO’s reaction to the terrorist threat faced by all Allies.”  The Alliance has noted, 
however, that the deployments to the United States will not affect its commitments 
elsewhere within the Treaty Area:  “The commitment to two further AWACS aircraft to 
join NATO’s first operational deployment in the US demonstrates the Alliance’s 
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determination to play a full part in the campaign against terrorism.  NATO will 
nonetheless continue to meet its operational responsibilities elsewhere, especially in the 
Balkans, in part because of the willingness of France and the United Kingdom to employ 
their national AWACs aircraft in this role.”205 
3.   NATO Standing Naval Forces  
On 6 October 2001 the NATO Standing Naval Force, Mediterranean (SNFM) was 
reassigned from Exercise Destined Glory 2001 off the coast of Spain to the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea.  The SNFM consists of nine ships from eight NATO countries,206 
and is one of four component surface fleets of the NATO Immediate Reaction Forces, 
which also include the Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic (SNFL) and the Mine 
Countermeasures Forces North and South (MCMFOR North and MCMFOR South).  
Once on station the SNFM provided presence and engaged in monitoring to “actively 
demonstrate NATO’s resolve and solidarity.”207  Operation Active Endeavor officially 
commenced on 26 October 2001 when the NAC issued an activation order. Eastern 
Mediterranean patrols began immediately after the task force was reassigned. 
Measure Seven requested a deployment of NATO naval forces to the eastern 
Mediterranean.  Due to the proximity of the SNFM it was the obvious choice for the 
initial deployment.  In early October 2001 the SNFL received orders that it would replace 
the SNFM in the eastern Mediterranean as part of a rotational deployment.  However, in 
contrast with the standard cycle of deployment, SNFL assets, along with additional assets 
pledged by the Allies, replaced SNFM ships during the winter furlough period. Each of 
the participating Allies maintained its naval commitments, either by keeping SNFL assets 
deployed throughout the furlough or by replacing them with other vessels. Additionally, 
some Allies that do not normally participate in the Standing Naval Forces placed ships at 
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NATO’s disposal to cover the holiday gap.208 The actions taken by the Allies in response 
to the US request for a standing naval force presence in the eastern Mediterranean have 
been more substantial than standard commitments of naval forces and subsequent 
participation.209 
 All of the Allies participating in SNFM or SNFL have maintained their 
commitments to these eastern Mediterranean operations except Canada. However, the 
HMCS Halifax was removed from SNFL to conduct operations in the Indian Ocean along 
with naval assets from France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, the United Kingdom and 
United States.210   
C. ALLIED BILATERAL MILITARY ACTIONS 
There was unanimity among the NATO Allies on the invocation of Article 5.  
Since that time, all 19 Allies have supported actions by NATO and in the larger 
international coalition.  The individual efforts by the Allies have been highly 
differentiated as each has sought to provide the most adequate and appropriate type of 
assistance based on its political, military and economic resources. For some of the Allies, 
assistance is solely through support of the Eight Measures requested by the United States, 
whereas others are providing more robust political and military support.  Presently, 
Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, the Netherlands, Turkey and the 
United Kingdom are involved in militarily operations outside the NATO area.  Further 
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requests by the United States for military assistance have been widely accepted by the 
major European powers.   
The willingness of the European Allies—along with Canada—to offer assistance 
has been so strong that political leaders in France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
have petitioned the United States to increase requests for military assistance from its 
European Allies.  French President Jacques Chirac had complained  in November 2001 
that Washington was slow to accept offers of assistance from its Allies.211  No military 
action is separate from politics, and Chirac’s complaints may have propelled US 
decisions to request the deployment of French and other Allied nations’ forces to 
Southwest Asia to participate in coalition operations.  However, in the French case, 
conditionality was evident when President Chirac, after noting that President Bush had 
requested additional assistance from France, stated that France would be willing to send 
members of its special forces units to Afghanistan—in fact a contingent of French 
Legionnaires had been coordinating with the US Special Operations Command in Tampa, 
Florida—if France could “know what the nature of their mission.”212   
French Defense Minister Alain Richard, along with German Chancellor Gerhard 
Schröder, has expressed concern about the widening of the war effort beyond 
Afghanistan.  These concerns developed over reports that the war on terrorism could 
spread to Iraq.  According to the BBC on 28 November 2001, Richard stated that a 
widening of the war to Iraq was not necessary.213  German concern over a possible 
widening of the war may stem from the domestic political difficulties that accompanied 
the decision to deploy 3,900 German troops for operations supporting the war in 
Afghanistan. According to the Chancellor, Germany “will do what is necessary, but 
reserve for ourselves the right to decide what is necessary.”  Moreover, Schröder said, 
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Germany is not  “simply waiting to intervene militarily elsewhere in the world, in 
countries such as Iraq or Somalia.”214  
The British government has been keenly aware of any waning of Allied political 
support, and lobbied early on for the US government to include its Allies in order to 
maintain political support for operations in Afghanistan.  Prime Minister Tony Blair has 
stated that the United Kingdom refuses to rule out further strikes beyond Afghanistan, 
and intends “to take what action we can against international terrorism in all its 
forms.”215    
1.   Bilateralism and NATO 
There are two levels of NATO involvement in the conduct of the present 
campaign against terrorism.  The first level is in conjunction with the invocation of 
Article 5 and the Eight Measures of support requested by the United States.  All of the 
associated operations are occurring within the North Atlantic Treaty area.  At the second 
level, specific Allies are participating in bilateral economic, military and political 
activities with the United States.  During the NATO Parliamentary Assembly of 9 
October 2001, the Allies recognized that it was  
the right of the United States, as the principal victim of the atrocities of 11 
September, to define the response that it must take against the 
perpetrators, and we support the statement by NATO Secretary General 
Lord Robertson that the United States has the lead role in this matter.216  
There are multiple reasons why NATO, with its members participating in a wide range of 
anti-terrorism activities, is not the overall authority for the operations against the Taliban 
regime and the Al-Qaida network.  In the words of NATO Secretary General Lord 
George Robertson, “NATO is the world's most effective military organisation. It will not 
be in the lead in every crisis. But it has a vital role - in my view the vital role - to play in 
multinational crisis prevention and crisis management.”217   
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President Bush remarked on 10 October 2001 that the United States was “building 
a very strong coalition against terror.  And NATO is the cornerstone of that coalition,” 
but the coalition also “goes way beyond NATO.”218  The President’s comments 
underscored the importance of NATO participation in the coalition, but also noted that 
NATO is not the lead institution for the fight against terrorism.  Four considerations must 
be taken into account concerning the NATO role within the coalition against terrorism. 
First, NATO is perceived as the principal representation of the ideals and culture 
of the West.  Article 2 of the Washington Treaty specifically addresses the shared 
community of values held by the members of NATO, and refers to those values as 
institutions.  The Article states that  
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and 
friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by 
bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these 
institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and 
well-being.219  
In January 1949, Secretary of State Dean Acheson had remarked of the ideal of Article 2 
that the “North Atlantic peoples share a common faith in fundamental human rights, in 
the dignity and worth of the human person, in the principles of democracy, personal 
freedom and political liberty.”220  NATO has been a means by which to defend those 
principles and institutions.  Moreover, Acheson and others saw the Alliance as “far more 
than a defensive arrangement.  It is an affirmation of the moral and spiritual values we 
hold in common.”221   
Second, NATO is not organized to conduct a global war on terrorism.  The Article 
5 invocation by the North Atlantic Council was in response to the 11 September 2001 
attacks against the United States.  The campaign against global terrorism has already 
extended beyond the Euro-Atlantic area.  As the war on terrorism spreads to distant 
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places such as Georgia, the Philippines, and Yemen, it becomes more evident that NATO 
is not properly equipped to lead or initiate all necessary operations. Moreover, the current 
US-led coalition includes Allies, Partners and Mediterranean Dialogue participants, as 
well as a host of other countries not involved with NATO at all.   
Third, NATO is currently conducting three military operations within Europe.  In 
other words, NATO’s “plate is full.”  A fourth operation would put further strain on 
NATO’s political and military structures.  It seems doubtful that the Alliance would be 
able, or willing, to lead an Enduring Freedom-type mission, along with SFOR, KFOR 
and Operation Amber Fox.  Moreover, the three current operations in the Balkans are 
adjacent to the Treaty area, whereas Afghanistan is far removed. 
Fourth, multiple terrorist organizations are active within individual NATO 
member countries.  If NATO became the lead institution by which to combat terrorism, 
the Alliance could be drawn into anti-terrorism actions within the territory of the Allies, 
with potential implications for their domestic political affairs.  For example, proposals for 
NATO actions against the ETA in Spain, the IRA in the United Kingdom, or the PKK in 
Turkey could lead to political fissures within the Alliance, and therefore threaten the 
solidarity of the anti-terror campaign. 
2.   Significant Allied Military Contributions 
Individually, many of the NATO Allies are currently participating alongside US 
forces in Operation Enduring Freedom.  All of these activities are taking place outside 
NATO.  However, some key developments portend future challenges and modes 
operation that will affect NATO missions in the near future.  Therefore, these non-NATO 
operations by NATO Allies need to be evaluated for their impact on the Alliance.  This 
chapter briefly discusses four examples:  the United Kingdom, France, Germany and 
Turkey. 
a.   The United Kingdom 
The United Kingdom continued a long-standing relationship of mutual 
trust and cooperation with the United States immediately after the 11 September attacks.  
Prime Minister Tony Blair declared that “We’ve [the British people] offered President 
Bush and the American people our solidarity, our profound sympathy, and our prayers.”  
Blair said that the battle was not 
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between the United States of America and terrorism, but between the free 
and democratic world and terrorism. We, therefore, here in Britain stand 
shoulder to shoulder with our American friends in this hour of tragedy, 
and we, like them, will not rest until this evil is driven from our world.222   
Since that time, owing perhaps to the second-highest casualty rate in the World Trade 
Center attacks,223 the United Kingdom has been perhaps America’s closest Ally in 
actions against the Al-Qaida and Taliban.  In the words of President George W. Bush, 
“America has no truer friend than Great Britain … Once again, we are joined together in 
a great cause—so honored the British Prime Minister has crossed an ocean to show his 
unity of purpose with America.”224  The close relationship discussed by President Bush 
and Prime Minister Blair was evident on 7 October 2001 when the British submarines 
HMS Trafalgar and HMS Triumph conducted Tomahawk land-attack cruise missile 
(TLAM) strikes on the opening day of the military campaign in Afghanistan, and then 
again on 13 October. 
The British government has also offered to lead the post-Taliban peace 
keeping force in Afghanistan.  Under the codename Operation Fingal, the United 
Kingdom is the initial authority for the Interim Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which 
was agreed to by multiple Afghani parties in Bonn, Germany.  The force, operating from 
the immediate Kabul area, will consist of personnel from the United Kingdom and 17 
other countries.225  The ISAF is designed to assist the Afghan Interim Government in 
“developing future security structures, … in reconstruction;” and in identification, 
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training, and assistance with “tasks for future Afghan security forces.”226 Twelve of the 
participating countries are NATO members, and five are members of the Partnership for 
Peace.  However, NATO is not officially involved with the program outside of limited 
coordination of humanitarian relief. 
b.   France 
Within NATO France has supported all measures in response to the 
attacks on the United States, including the invocation of Article 5, the deployment of the 
NAEW&C Force and the Standing Naval Forces, and the NAC agreement to support all 8 
measures requested by the United States.  The use of French national assets to backfill for 
the NAEW&C Forces in the Balkans while NATO aircraft are deployed to the United 
States is perhaps the most significant aspect of the French support.  In sum, France has 
continued a tradition of political resolve, despite intra-Alliance disagreements, to support 
NATO military actions. 
c.  Germany 
In the years since Germany’s reunification on 3 October 1990, its role 
within NATO has adapted to multiple changes in the security environment.  However, in 
contrast with the difficulties of German participation in out-of-area operations discussed 
in Chapter III, the 11 September attacks involved a German Ally in “a system of mutual 
collective security.” Under the authority of the German Basic Law, through an alliance 
such as NATO, Germany can contribute to the effort to “secure a peaceful and lasting 
order in Europe and among the nations of the world.”227 
Immediately following the attacks Chancellor Schröder informed 
President Bush that all German bases and facilities would be available for use by the 
United States for operations against terrorism.  Since then more than two-thirds of the 
logistics, supply and personnel transport to the Southwest Asia area of operations have 
reportedly passed through US and German bases in Germany.  In a move to show 
“unlimited solidarity,” the German government also pledged up to 3,900 troops.228  
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228 Specifically, the United States requested five forms of assistance from Germany:  Fuchs armored 
According to Schröder, because of Germany’s participation in the 
Alliance, Germany has “assumed obligations to assist the Americans, obligations which 
we will fulfill.”229 Schröder expressed the desire to pay all due regard to the German 
Basic Law, and at the same time to express “unrestricted” solidarity with the United 
States.   
Alliance solidarity is not a one-way street. That is why we must now 
render our practical contribution to that solidarity - the purpose of which, 
after all, is to defend our common values, attain common objectives, and 
build our future together in security and freedom.230   
Germany’s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom is not juridically 
linked to its NATO obligations.  Currently, Germany has met its Alliance obligations by 
upholding the eight measures requested by the United States under Article 5.  The current 
German leadership views the nation’s commitments on a broader scale, however, and that 
solidarity is demonstrated outside of NATO arrangements.    
 d.  Turkey 
The political and military support by Turkey serves an important 
psychological role in the current war on terrorism in Southwest Asia.  The Al-Qaida 
leadership, the Taliban regime, and their sympathizers have labeled the US-led actions 
against terrorism since 11 September as a war of aggression by the West against Islam.  
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However, Turkey, a NATO member, has a population that is 99% Muslim.  According to 
Turkish Foreign Minister Ismael Cem, “In Turkey we believe that this is not a war that 
belongs to the United States alone.  It’s our war, Turkey’s war, as well.”231  Foreign 
Minister Cem has also stated that Turkey has “supported the United States as the leader 
in this global fight against terrorism.  We stand together with the United States.  We are 
sure that the outcome of this fight will be won, a victory … for all those who want to 
have a peaceful world.”232  Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit also immediately gave the 
United States Turkey’s full support after the United States presented evidence to its 
Allies on 2 October 2001 on Al-Qaida’s role in the attacks.   
Turkey’s proximity to current and possible future military operations 
makes its cooperation fundamental to the anti-terror coalition.  Accordingly, Turkey’s 
political and military leaders affirmed on 8 October 2001 that they would support any 
NATO decision within the framework of the Article 5 invocation.233  As Steven Cook 
has noted, “Turkey—a NATO Ally, Muslim country, and aspirant to full-membership in 
the European Union—can offer the United States support in a range of areas where 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states are either unable or reluctant to assist.”234  
Unlike some Islamic states, Turkey does not question the linkages between the 11 
September attacks and the bin Laden-led organization.  Prime Minister Ecevit was 
reported as saying on 3 October 2001, following the US disclosure of information to the 
Allies of the linkage between the Al-Qaida network and the 11 September attacks, that  
“The fact that the US found it [the evidence against Al-Qaida] persuasive persuades us 
[the Turks] also.”235  
Although the Turkish government has supported military actions against 
the Al-Qaida network and the Taliban, 80% of the country’s population disapproves of 
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the deployment of Turkish forces to Afghanistan,236 and roughly two-thirds of the 
Turkish population disapproved of the US-led attacks on the Taliban regime.237  A large 
majority of the population remains uncomfortable with the idea of attacking a fellow 
Muslim country, or is concerned that the war will next turn toward Iraq.  Additionally, 
58% of Turks believe that the US-led operations in Afghanistan could spark a war 
between Christians and Muslims.238 The government does not share this view.  In the 
words of Foreign Minister Cem, “terrorism does not have a religion, terrorism does not 
have a geography, and terrorism does not and cannot have a justification.”239  
Turkey’s participation in Operation Enduring Freedom, and possible 
participation in further military actions, could lead to NATO involvement in a second 
Article 5 contingency.  First, current popular sentiment in Turkey and elsewhere believes 
that the operations will continue to expand geographically, with many pundits offering 
Iraq as the next logical target of the global anti-terror coalition.  Obviously, Turkish 
participation in future operations against Iraq could lead to threats to Turkish security.  
Second, Turkey has suffered from two decades of terrorist activity by separatist Kurd 
factions and radical Islamic groups including the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), Turkish 
Hizballah and Islami Buyuk Akincilar Cephesi (Great Raiders Front of Islam).240  US 
Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated that the United States understands that Turkey 
“has suffered from terrorism in the past and fully recognizes the importance of the 
mission that we are now all embarked upon.”241   
Each of these situations could lead to an Article 5 contingency.  On the 
one hand, operations against Iraq could lead to the type of sub-regional contingency 
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discussed in Chapter III.  On the other hand, the second scenario could involve NATO in 
the response to international terrorist attacks.  Terrorist actions against Turkey from 
foreign sources could be grounds for Article 5 invocation, as with the 11 September 2001 
attacks on the United States. 
D.   NATO NON-MILITARY ACTIONS 
NATO recognized promptly that a potential humanitarian tragedy loomed in 
Afghanistan.  On 13 November 2001, the NAC requested that NATO’s military 
authorities prepare contingency plans for possible humanitarian operations in 
Afghanistan.  The Allies felt that the invaluable experience gained from dealing with the 
multi-border refugee crises in the Balkans in 1998-1999 made the Alliance an appropriate 
vehicle for humanitarian relief.  NATO estimated in April 1998 that the Serbian military 
and militia campaigns of ethnic cleansing had resulted in the flight of 226,000 refugees to 
Albania, 125,000 to the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and 33,000 to 
Montenegro.  The numbers of refugees increased substantially.  Following Operation 
Allied Force and the establishment of NATO’s KFOR and the UN Mission in Kosovo, 
over 900,000 refugees returned to Serbia and Kosovo.242  NATO assisted other 
organizations in dealing with the refugee crisis and providing the conditions for the 
refugees’ return to their homeland.  Moreover, the NATO Allies have the appropriate 
logistical means to transport large amounts of relief supplies.  NATO offered to be the 
lead relief organization through the 2001-2002 winter,243 a pledge that did not come to 
fruition.  The Alliance has stated that it remains ready to play a role in a larger relief 
effort along with the United Nations and humanitarian organizations.244  
On 25 and 26 October 2001, the heads of civil-emergency planning organizations 
of NATO and Partner countries met to confer on the implications of the 11 September 
attacks. The Parties agreed to inventory national capabilities, including transport, 
medical, and scientific assets, which would be available in the event of a biological, 
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chemical or radiological attack against an Ally or Partner.  NATO offered the Euro-
Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Center, located at NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels, as a “clearing house” or coordination center for international assistance.  In 
recent years the Center has performed similar duties in responding to natural disasters.245   
Additionally, NATO has used its medical, political and military assets to evaluate 
the threat of terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction.   The NATO WMD 
Center’s agenda has reflected the “increased awareness of the potential use of weapons of 
mass destruction by non-state actors.”  The WMD Center is evaluating the threat to the 
Alliance posed by “biological and chemical agents, toxic industrial chemicals, as well as 
radiological devices.”246 
E.  VALIDATION OF NATO ENLARGEMENT 
NATO enlargement, like other NATO activities, is directed at extending Western 
institutions, defined by NATO as  “liberty, … democracy, human rights and the rule of 
law.”247  Enlargement of the Alliance is also perceived as part of a broader approach to 
security based on what some observers have called “democratic peace theory.”  
According to a NATO document,   
[D]emocratic societies are not a threat to each other. They do not try to 
impose their own way of life on other countries and do not attempt to 
expand their territory by using military force.  On the contrary, they are 
stable and offer opportunities for growth and economic development.  The 
stability provided by NATO enabled Western Europe to rebuild its 
prosperity after years of war.  Now, that investment is being shared by 
Europe as a whole.  Stability creates confidence and predictability.248 
In the words of Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, “The events 
of September 11th have changed many things, but they have not invalidated our agenda 
pre-September.  If anything, they have reinforced the logic of that agenda.”249  Since 
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249 NATO Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, Speech to the Atlantic Treaty 
Association, Bled, Slovenia, 4 October 2001, available online at:  
“[I]nstability and violence is the most fertile ground possible for terrorism,”250  NATO’s 
promotion of stability in the Euro-Atlantic area helps to eliminate the breeding grounds 
of terrorism.  “By contrast, there is no more hostile an environment for a terrorist than a 
stable, prosperous country in a peaceful, secure region.”251  One of the reasons why 
terrorist organizations can operate in Afghanistan is its status as a failed state.   
Enlargement of the Alliance, especially through the Membership Action Plan (MAP), 
will assist in eliminating environments in which terrorism can flourish. 
Therefore, rather than instigating a change in NATO policies, the attacks have 
“reinforced the logic of NATO enlargement.”252  Additionally, NATO’s ties with 
Partnership countries have shown increased value.  The associations built with “Russia, 
and even … far away places like Central Asia,” have become “crucially important in an 
emergency.”253 
F.   THE EFFECTS OF THE INVOCATION OF ARTICLE 5 ON THE 
REINVIGORATION OF THE NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONSHIP 
The NATO-Russia relationship, bolstered by the NATO-Russia Founding Act and 
the establishment of the Permanent Joint Council in 1997, came under severe strain in the 
late 1990s.  NATO enlargement, Operation Allied Force, and US plans to construct a 
strategic ballistic missile defense system served to divide Russia and the Alliance.  
Ironically, the invocation of Article 5, the archetypal expression of Cold War bipolarism, 
assisted NATO-Russian rapprochement by placing Article 5 in a context that could 
finally be understood by Russia.254  The commonality of vulnerability to terrorism 
resonated within the Russian Federation, and for the first time NATO actions could be 
perceived apart from real or imaginary antagonism with Russia.   
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NATO Secretary General Robertson recognized that the 11 September 2001 
attacks had altered the antagonistic trend:  
For some forty years NATO and Russia sat and glowered at each other, for 
another ten years we tip-toed around each other but now I believe that we 
are entering an era where substantial and practical cooperation is going to 
build a unique relationship between us.255 
In consultations since 11 September 2001, NATO and Russia have sought to “forge a 
new relationship” by giving “new impetus and substance to our partnership, with the goal 
of creating a new council bringing together NATO member states and Russia to identify 
and pursue opportunities for joint action at 20.”256  Although statements referring to 
NATO-Russia cooperation “at 20” may seem to be a precursor to Russian membership in 
NATO, in reality they are illustrative of agreements whereby NATO and Russia can seek 
a higher degree of consultation and cooperation on specific issues.  The first issue for 
consultation between the NAC and Russia is terrorism.  Several initiatives have already 
begun, and they include the  
regular exchange of information and in-depth consultation on issues 
relating to terrorist threats, the prevention of the use by terrorists of 
ballistic missile technology and nuclear, biological and chemical agents, 
civil emergency planning, and the exploration of the role of the military in 
combating terrorism.257  
Unlike NATO enlargement, Operation Allied Force, and US strategic ballistic 
missile defense, terrorism resonates with Russians as a legitimate security concern for 
cooperation between NATO and Russia.  Succeeding actions by Russia in support of the 
anti-terror campaign confirm that common interests can in some circumstances surmount 
political divisions.258  For NATO, the newfound Russian cooperation, combined with 
Moscow’s will to assist in the prosecution of the war on terrorism, illustrates a “new 
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quality in NATO-Russia relations.”  As a result, the Alliance looks “forward to building 
on this cooperation and deepening NATO-Russia relations to meet the new challenges 
faced by the entire Euro-Atlantic community.”259 
Critics nonetheless perceive Russia’s change in attitude as part of a self-serving 
policy designed to strengthen its own position in the international arena.   Some analysts 
argue that Russia is seeking justification, if not support, for its heavy-handed tactics 
against the Chechens.  There is a definite linkage between the 11 September 2001 attacks 
and Russian terrorism concerns, as the Al-Qaida network has clear ties to certain groups 
of Islamic militants in Chechnya.260  
Revised perceptions of Russia’s activities in Chechnya have been evident in 
statements by some Western officials.  In September 2001 German Chancellor Schröder 
said that “Regarding Chechnya, there will be and must be a more differentiated 
evaluation of world opinion.”261 Germany is among many Western countries that had 
previously criticized Russian tactics in Chechnya, which have included the indiscriminate 
bombing of civilian areas, torture, murder, various human rights abuses, and restrictions 
on the press.  More pragmatic needs have led many politicians in the West to recast their 
statements on Russia’s actions in Chechnya.  An unnamed senior member of Schröder’s 
Social Democrat Party has stated that “Silence on Chechnya is the price for this new 
solidarity [between Russia and the West] … And I don’t think Germany will be the only 
country to pay it.”262  For the West, there is the hope that a closer relationship will usher 
in continued cordiality with Russia that will promote its democratization. Coordination 
against terrorism could lead to further dialogue and understanding on NATO 
enlargement, and perhaps less political opposition in Russia.263  For the time being, 
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NATO’s acquiescence regarding Russian actions in Chechnya may reflect desires to 
build a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship between the former adversaries.  
Presently it seems that a working relationship with NATO is perceived by Russia as more 
beneficial than continued haranguing about non-Article 5 operations or NATO 
enlargement.   
G.   CONCLUSIONS 
Since NATO’s bold move to invoke Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, 
opposing currents of opinion concerning the relationship between the United States and 
its Allies have been evident.  This discourse directly concerns the role of collective 
defense in NATO.  First, in the weeks that followed the attacks in New York and 
Washington, American critics of European policies questioned what appeared to be the 
waning resolve of some of America’s allies.  In October 2001 an American commentator 
claimed that “America’s friends have intoned that the United States should be wary of a 
military response,” and that Europeans in general “recoil at raw patriotism, and exhibit 
angst at the thought of a large and violent response.”  Moreover, he wrote that “Most 
European countries are disinclined to commit armed forces”264 to any upcoming US 
military campaign.  
Additionally, some European officials have reacted harshly to hard-line American 
tactics and threats of unilateral action.  Notably, the European Union’s External Relations 
Commissioner, Chris Patten, had stated in May 2001 that the European Union should 
attempt to “persuade the US to embrace and maintain its multilateral commitments.”265  
More recently, Patten called President Bush’s January 2002 references to an “axis of 
evil” consisting of Iran, Iraq and North Korea "absolutist and simplistic."  Patten and 
other EU officials have warned that a serious rift in US-European relations could 
develop.  Patten has called for Europeans to stop Washington before it goes into 
"unilateralist overdrive."  According to Patten, "Gulliver can't go it alone, and I don't 
ourselves as so Lilliputian that we can't speak up and say think it's helpful if we regard                                                  
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it.”266  Similarly, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin has warned that the United States 
should not “give in to the strong temptation of unilateralism.”267 
Despite such criticism, the Alliance invoked Article 5, and remains committed to 
the conduct and support, both “individually and collectively,” of “the ongoing US-led 
military operations against the terrorists who perpetrated the 11 September outrages and 
those who provide them sanctuary.”268  Rather than shrink back from action, America’s 
European Allies, along with Canada, reacted immediately to the attacks and invoked 
Article 5.  NATO’s prompt invocation was impressive in that 19 nations had to 
consensually agree on this decision.   
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, some observers argued that Article 5 was 
not relevant to the security concerns of the post-Cold War age.  However, on 11 
September 2001 these criticisms were exposed as invalid.  In the words of Lord 
Robertson,  
[A]fter September 11th we know that no member of the Alliance is 
invulnerable.  And the response of NATO governments demonstrates that 
these commitments on which the Alliance has been based for 52 years 
remain tangible, real and reciprocal.  NATO’s historic decision to invoke 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty underscored categorically the 
fundamental link between two continents and among 19 nations.269  
Terrorism has presently become the focus of Alliance defense policy; but the 
Alliance is continuing its long-standing pursuit of stability, democratization and a broader 
concept of security in the Euro-Atlantic area. Terrorism is no longer a topic mentioned 
briefly in major NATO policy documents.  In December 2001, the North Atlantic 
Council meeting of Defense Ministers agreed that   
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The Alliance must adapt its capabilities to these changes in the conditions 
of security and stability … Such action must of course make use of a wide 
range of national and international means, of which military ones are only 
a part. As complements to civilian instruments, however, defence and 
military tools may be essential for a number of purposes including 
gathering intelligence; acting against terrorists and those who harbour 
them; protecting populations, infrastructure, and forces against their 
attacks; and dealing with the consequences of attacks that might 
nevertheless occur. 270   
More specifically, NATO is reassessing the threat posed by terrorism to its members, and 
the means by which the Alliance can deter terrorism. 
A new assessment of the threat posed by terrorism is being prepared; 
proposals for improving the Alliance’s preparedness against terrorism 
involving chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear weapons have been 
advanced; and the Allies concerned are examining the implications of 
terrorism for national defence plans in the context of NATO’s force 
planning system. We are vigorously pursuing our efforts to prevent the 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and 
intensifying our cooperation in the field of civil emergency planning.271 
To adapt the Alliance to deal with the terrorism threat the NATO Defense Ministers 
agreed to conduct several practical measures:   
1) further consideration, as noted earlier, of the way in which the Alliance 
can contribute in the defence field to the struggle against terrorism;  
2) preparation by the NATO Military Authorities, on the basis of guidance 
to be provided by the Council in Permanent Session, of a military concept 
for defence against terrorism, following the development of the new threat 
assessment, for approval by the Council in Permanent Session;  
3) a review of the effectiveness of the Alliance’s defence and military 
policies, structures and capabilities for the full range of its missions 
against the background of the threat posed by terrorism;  
4) further efforts by the Senior Defence Group on Proliferation, in 
consultation with other relevant NATO bodies, to improve the Alliance’s 
capability to cope with the possible use by terrorists of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear materials;  
5) further efforts by nations and by the relevant Alliance bodies to identify 
possible measures in all relevant DCI capability areas, in both the short 
                                                 
270 NATO Defense Ministers, Press Release 173, Statement on Combating Terrorism:  Adapting the 
Alliance's Defence Capabilities, 18 December 2001, par. 2, Available online at:  
http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm. 
271 Ibid. par. 4. 
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and long term, or additional efforts that would enhance the Alliance’s 
defensive posture against terrorist attacks; and,  
6) enhanced sharing of information among the Allies on threat warnings 
and intelligence assessments, concepts, structures, equipment, training, 
and exercising of military forces designed to combat terrorist threats, and 
on other measures that could improve the Alliance’s defence posture 
against such threats.272 
The Defense Ministers avowed that the Alliance must “be able to carry out its 
missions, taking into account the threat posed by terrorism.”  Moreover, “NATO’s ability 
to respond to terrorism must be an integral, albeit urgent, part of the more general 
ongoing work to improve Alliance military capabilities.”273  Terrorism is no longer a 
separate, somewhat hypothetical concern, but is now being integrated into the overall 
Alliance political and military strategies. 
NATO has become stronger since the 11 September attacks.  All of the Allies 
participated in the Article 5 invocation, and they have supported such action as deemed 
necessary, “including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the 
North Atlantic area.”274  Rather than shirking involvement, many Allies have actually 
petitioned the United States for an increased role in the operations in Afghanistan.  In 
their view, a greater level of inclusion of the European Allies in these operations is the 
surest way to maintain a strong international coalition against terrorism.  America’s 
Allies are also able to help in non-military ways.  The United States must seek counsel 
from its Allies, more experienced with certain aspects of the threat of terrorism, regarding 
the best procedures by which to pursue domestic counter-terrorism security. The current 
acrimonious dialogue between certain US and European political leaders should not be 
seen as an aberration, but rather as part of the process whereby sovereign allies influence 
each other’s policies.   
It should not be overlooked that the moment Article 5 was invoked, the NATO 
Allies added themselves, unequivocally, to the possible target list of future Al-Qaida or 
Al-Qaida-type terrorist attacks.  Yet, NATO remains “the world’s largest and most 
” and the Alliance and its members “will be central to the effective permanent coalition,                                                 
272 Ibid. par. 7. 
273 Ibid. par. 8. 
274 The North Atlantic Treaty, 4 April 1949, Article 5. 
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collective response of the international community to terrorism, both now and in the 
longer-term.”275 
 
                                                 
275 NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, “An Attack on US All:  NATO’s Response to 
Terrorism,” Speech at the Atlantic Council of the United States, National Press Club, Washington DC, 10 
October 2001, Available online at:  http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011010b.htm.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS:  NATO AS A TREATY AND AN 
INSTITUTION  
The codification of a system of collective defense uniting nations of Western 
Europe and North America was partially in reaction to the failure of the collective 
security design of the League of Nations.  Both NATO and the League of Nations were 
established following a world war as a means to deter future aggression.  The Treaty of 
Versailles established the League in 1919 as a collective security pact. In the words of 
Martin Wight, collective security is “a system in which any breach of the peace is 
declared to be of concern to all the participating states, and an attack one is taken as an 
attack on all.”276  Perhaps the most famous proponent of this theory of collective security 
was Immanuel Kant.  
Peoples, as states, like individuals, may be judged to injure one another 
merely by their coexistence in the state of nature (i.e., while independent 
of external laws). Each of them may and should for the sake of its own 
security demand that the others enter with it into a constitution similar to 
the civil constitution, for under such a constitution each can be secure in 
his rights. This would be a league of nations.277 
However, despite its lofty goals, the League of Nations failed to cope with the challenges 
of the security environment and was unable to stop the acts pf aggression that led to the 
Second World War. 
 In contrast with an all-inclusive collective security system, in 1949 the Parties to 
the North Atlantic Treaty united a selected group of nations with a shared history and 
culture in a system of collective defense.  Rather than prevent all forms of conflict, or 
create a Kellogg-Briand-type pact against war, the NATO nations joined together to 
defend themselves against a single, although not explicitly identified, adversary.  Within 
NATO, each member has contributed to the overall defensive posture, and all members 
have benefited from the collective nature of the union.   
                                                 
276 Martin Wight, System of States, 1977, quoted in David S. Yost, NATO Transformed, p. 9. 
277 Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch, 1795, available online at:  
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/kant/kant1.htm.  
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The institutional evolution from the North Atlantic Treaty to the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization is evidence of how multiple nations, each with different perceptions 
of vital interests, can act in concert and create a state of equilibrium in which defense 
priorities become intertwined.  With the 1950 decision for “the establishment at the 
earliest possible date of an integrated force under centralized command, which shall be 
adequate to deter aggression and to ensure the defence of Western Europe,”278 Article 5 
of the North Atlantic Treaty served as the political-military bedrock on which the 
institutionalized NATO was built.279  This construction was possible because of the 
foundational aspect of Article 5; the basic interest of all the Parties—national survival—
could be met.  Moreover, the Cold War threat was so severe that defeat by the Soviet 
Union and its allies would have entailed cultural, economic, military, and political 
subjugation.  Therefore, Article 5 was recognized as the essential commitment that might 
deter such an attack or provide the means by which the Western powers could repel a 
Soviet invasion. A challenge to the potency of the collective defense guarantee would 
jeopardize the security of each Ally and of the Alliance as a whole.  Defection from 
treaty obligations became unthinkable in either peacetime or war.  Defection would 
lessen the collective defense capability of NATO, but it would also leave the defector to 
stand alone against a superior threat.   
Throughout the Cold War, Article 5 remained a steadfast guarantee of collective 
action and support.  During that time, interpretations of Article 5 were adapted to meet 
contemporary strategic challenges.  Often these adaptations are referred to as crises 
within the Alliance.  However, what appears in the present to be a crisis may appear with 
hindsight to have been the development process of consensus among the member states.  
The adaptability of Article 5 in this period, coupled with the willingness of the Allies to 
maintain a credible collective deterrent, enhanced the process of consultation and 
consensus building within the Alliance.  Even when the means to organize a West 
German military contribution were debated for four years, there was still a general  
recognition that a West German contribution was required.  Similarly, France brought 
                                                 
278 North Atlantic Council, Final Communiqué, New York, United States, 26 September 1950. 
279 Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty provided for the North Atlantic Council and a defense 
committee and other subsidiary bodies. 
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about a redefinition of its status in relation to several Alliance institutions, but did not 
seek to hamper the ability of NATO to act for the collective defense.  Disagreements 
among sovereign nations are common, and one can see certain continuities in national 
interest-based arguments among the Allies in both the EDC debate of the 1950s and the 
current discussions about the war against terrorism. 
The institutions built during forty years of consultations and preparations for 
collective defense became precious assets for the Allies.  Once the Cold War was 
extinguished, NATO sought to apply those institutionalized norms to the evolving 
security environment.  These same norms won the admiration of former adversaries and 
other non-NATO nations in the Euro-Atlantic area.  The NATO model of collective 
action and consultation, based on the collective defense pledge, was perceived as the 
soundest way to address the economic and political challenges of post-Cold War Europe.  
In this new security environment Article 5 retained its viability as the “bedrock” of 
NATO even against “risks of a wider nature.”280  With the Allies protected from a large-
scale war with another state through Article 5, the member nations could focus on 
“broader challenges,” and work with “appropriate multilateral forums in the widest 
possible cooperation with other states.”281   
Just as the Allies sought in MC 14/3 to define how they might deter and defend 
against limited actions by the Soviet Union, not previously addressed by NATO strategic 
guidance, in the post-Cold War period they adopted a broader concept of risks and 
threats, which included “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the 
flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage.”282  In the end the stability 
provided by NATO, which provided the security framework in which Western Europe 
rebuilt its prosperity after years of war, was extended to former adversaries and other 
non-NATO countries.  In 1999 US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright said that the 
Alliance had become a vital institution that proposed “over time to do for Europe’s East 
what NATO has already helped to do for Europe’s West.” 283 
                                                 
280 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7 November 1991, par. 12. 
281 The North Atlantic Council, The Rome Declaration, 7 November 1991, par. 19. 
282 North Atlantic Council, Strategic Concept, 7 November 1991, par. 12. 
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283 US Secretary of States Madeleine Albright, 12 March 1999, quoted in Jeremy Bransten, Radio 
The institutionalized adaptability of Article 5 led to its invocation and application 
under circumstances radically different from those for which it was previously 
envisioned.  Firstly, the actions taken by NATO since the 11 September 2001 attacks 
have shown that Article 5 retains its validity.  Secondly, these actions have shown that, 
although Article 5 is the bedrock of NATO, it is not written in granite.  In the months 
since the 11 September attacks, it has become apparent that through NATO’s actions, 
Article 5 has developed an increasing degree of malleability.  A flexible, case-by-case 
approach to meeting Article 5 contingencies may modify the significance of NATO’s 
collective defense guarantees, thereby enabling the Allies to counter the security 
challenges of the 21st Century more effectively.   
The original language of Article 5 was designed to allow for a wide degree of 
acceptance by the governments of the initial members.  A collective principle that was 
too strong or that required automaticity of action could have resulted in the rejection of 
the North Atlantic Treaty by one or more of the first 12 Allies.  For instance, the United 
States would have been unable to ratify a treaty that necessitated immediate military 
action.  The ability to declare war rests solely with the US Congress.  In a modern 
context, an openness to interpretation allows Article 5 to be more politically and 
militarily inclusive, providing for its possible application in a wide range of scenarios.  
There has been a true adaptation of the standard interpretation of Article 5.  In October 
2001 NATO Secretary General Lord George Robertson noted that “For decades, pundits 
had been arguing about the true meaning and value of Article 5 and whether it had lost its 
meaning altogether with the end of the Soviet threat.”  In Robertson’s view,  
[A]fter September 11th, we know that no member of the Alliance is 
invulnerable.  And the response of NATO governments demonstrates that 
these commitments on which the Alliance has been based for 52 years 
remain tangible, real and reciprocal.  NATO’s historic decision to invoke 
Article 5 of the Washington Treaty underscored categorically the 
fundamental link between two continents and among 19 nations.284  
                                                 
Free Europe/Radio Liberty.  “1999 In Review:  New Challenges as NATO Moves East,” p. 1, available 
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284 NATO Secretary General, Lord George Robertson, Speech to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, 
Ottawa, Canada, 9 October 2001, available online at: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011009a.htm.  
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As the Secretary General pointed out on 5 October 2001, the time since 11 September 
2001 has been a period of “self-examination.”  In his view the terrorist threat has ripped 
“away illusions. It forces us all to look at hard truths, and to demonstrate, through word 
and deed, where we stand—and what we stand for.”285 
NATO has taken a highly practical approach to its first Article 5 invocation.  The 
Allies have continued to show “solidarity and resolve” both militarily and politically.  
These actions prove NATO’s continued relevance and the authority of its guarantee of 
collective defense.  Current operations, split between NATO actions in the Treaty area 
and separate actions of the Allies outside the NATO framework, are not necessarily the 
new paradigm for collective action.  There is a high probability that a NATO Ally will be 
attacked again one day.  The next attack may not be conducted by international terrorists.  
However, because of the adaptability of Article 5, collective defense has become a more 
integrated part of the continuum of institutional cooperation and consultation activities. 
Article 5 can no longer be viewed as a Cold War provision.  Collective defense is as 
relevant in the present age as the community of values and institutions mentioned in 
Article 2, the consultation obligations specified in Article 4, and the increased 
membership potential discussed in Article 10.  Article 5’s collective defense guarantee 
will therefore remain relevant as the bedrock principle of “the world’s most effective 
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APPENDIX A - THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY 
 
Washington D.C. - 4 April 1949 
The Parties to this Treaty reaffirm their faith in the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 
Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and all governments.  
They are determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples, founded 
on the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law. They seek to promote stability and 
well-being in the North Atlantic area.  
They are resolved to unite their efforts for collective defence and for the preservation of peace and security. 
They therefore agree to this North Atlantic Treaty : 
Article 1 
The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any 
international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner 
that international peace and security and justice are not endangered, and to refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the 
purposes of the United Nations.  
Article 2 
The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly 
international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better 
understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by 
promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in 
their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between 
any or all of them.  
Article 3 
In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately 
and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain 
and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.  
Article 4 
The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial 
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened  
Article 5 
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North 
America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, 
if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or 
collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will 
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assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert 
with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed 
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.  
Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be 
reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security 
Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and 
security .  
Article 6287  
For the purpose of Article 5, an armed attack on one or more of the Parties is deemed to 
include an armed attack:  
on the territory of any of the Parties in Europe or North America, on the Algerian 
Departments of France,288 on the territory of or on the Islands under the jurisdiction of 
any of the Parties in the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer;  
on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the Parties, when in or over these territories or 
any other area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the Parties were stationed 
on the date when the Treaty entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North 
Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.  
Article 7 
This Treaty does not affect, and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights 
and obligations under the Charter of the Parties which are members of the United 
Nations, or the primary responsibility of the Security Council for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.  
Article 8 
Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it 
and any other of the Parties or any third State is in conflict with the provisions of this 
Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this 
Treaty.  
Article 9 
                                                 
287 The definition of the territories to which Article 5 applies was revised by Article 2 of the Protocol 
to the North Atlantic Treaty on the accession of Greece and Turkey signed on 22 October 1951. 
288 On January 16, 1963, the North Atlantic Council noted that insofar as the former Algerian 
Departments of France were concerned, the relevant clauses of this Treaty had become inapplicable as from 
July 3, 1962.  
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The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to 
consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall be so 
organised as to be able to meet promptly at any time. The Council shall set up such 
subsidiary bodies as may be necessary; in particular it shall establish immediately a 
defence committee which shall recommend measures for the implementation of Articles 
3 and 5.  
Article 10 
The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position 
to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North 
Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the 
Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United 
States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of 
the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.  
Article 11 
This Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the Parties in accordance 
with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be 
deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the United States of America, 
which will notify all the other signatories of each deposit. The Treaty shall enter into 
force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the ratifications of the majority 
of the signatories, including the ratifications of Belgium, Canada, France, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States, have been deposited and 
shall come into effect with respect to other States on the date of the deposit of their 
ratifications.289  
Article 12 
After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, or at any time thereafter, the Parties shall, 
if any of them so requests, consult together for the purpose of reviewing the Treaty, 
having regard for the factors then affecting peace and security in the North Atlantic area, 
including the development of universal as well as regional arrangements under the 
Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.  
Article 13 
After the Treaty has been in force for twenty years, any Party may cease to be a Party one 
year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the United 
                                                 




States of America, which will inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit 
of each notice of denunciation  
Article 14 
This Treaty, of which the English and French texts are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. Duly 







































APPENDIX B - LETTER FROM PRESIDENT DE GAULLE TO PRESIDENT 
JOHNSON, PARIS, MARCH 7, 1966 
Source: Department of State, Central Files, DEF 4 NATO. No classification marking. 
The text of the letter was transmitted in telegram 5559 from Paris, March 7, received at 
2:45 p.m. and passed to the White House at 2:59 p.m. (Ibid.) This letter is also printed in 
American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 317-318.  
Dear Mr. President:  
In three years our Atlantic Alliance will complete its first term. I am anxious to tell you 
that France appreciates the extent to which the solidarity of defense thus established 
between 15 free peoples of the West contributes to assuring their security and, especially 
what essential role the United States of America plays in this respect. Accordingly, 
France intends from now on to remain party to the Treaty signed at Washington on April 
4, 1949. This means that except in the event of developments which might occur in the 
course of the next three years to change the fundamental factors of East-West relations, 
she will be in 1969 and thereafter determined even as today to fight at the side of her 
allies in case one of them will be the object of unprovoked aggression.  
However, France considers the changes which have taken place or in process of occurring 
since 1949 in Europe, Asia, and elsewhere, as well as evolution of her own situation and 
her own forces no longer justify insofar as that concerns her the arrangements of a 
military nature adopted after the conclusion of the alliance, whether in common under the 
form of multilateral conventions or whether by special agreement between the French 
Government and the American Government.  
It is for this reason that France proposes to recover the entire exercise of her sovereignty 
over her territory, presently impaired by the permanent presence of allied military 
elements or by constant utilization which is made of her air space, to terminate her 
participation in "integrated" commands and no longer to place her forces at the disposal 
of NATO. It goes without saying that for the application of these decisions she is ready to 
arrange with the governments and in particular with that of the United States, practical 
measures which concern them. In addition, she is disposed to have understandings with 
them as to military facilities to be mutually accorded in the case of a conflict in which she 
would be engaged at their sides and as to conditions of cooperation of her forces and 






On all these points, Dear Mr. President, my Government will therefore be in touch with 
yours. But in order to respond to the spirit of friendly candor which must inspire the 
relations between our two countries and, permit me to add between you and me, I have 
been desirous firstly to indicate personally to you for what reasons, for what purpose and 
within what limits France from her viewpoint believes the form of our alliance should be 
modified without altering its basis.  
I beg you to accept, Dear Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration and 







































APPENDIX C - LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON TO PRESIDENT DE 
GAULLE, WASHINGTON, MARCH 22, 1966 
 
 
Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 67 D 272. No classification 
marking. The source text bears no drafting information. A notation on a covering 
memorandum states that the original was handed to Ambassador Lucet on March 22. The 
letter is also printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1966, pp. 321-323.  
Dear Mr. President:  
On March 7 you wrote to inform me of the general course of action your Government 
proposes to follow with regard to the North Atlantic Treaty and the organization and 
arrangements which have been set up to serve its purposes.  The course you propose will 
so seriously affect the security and well-being of citizens of all the allied states that I felt 
it imperative to seek the counsel of the other Treaty members before replying in detail. I 
should like now to set forth what seem to me the fundamentals of this matter.  
Let me begin with the American conception of the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty 
and the Alliance it creates. Under our Constitution, that Treaty is the law of the land. Like 
our Constitution, it is more than a legal document. It is the outward and visible form of a 
living institution--not an alliance to make war, but an alliance to keep the peace. For 
nearly two decades this alliance has assured the peace and security of the North Atlantic 
area. It has greatly reinforced stability throughout the world.  
The Alliance, in our view, reflects two important propositions. The first is that if war 
should come to the Atlantic area, we must fight together--and fight effectively. The 
second is that if we act together for the common interest during peace, war will not come. 
The organization designed to carry out both these propositions, NATO, became in fact an 
Organization for Peace. To that Organization, which grew significantly out of France's 
own needs and urgings, France and many distinguished Frenchmen have made an 
inestimable contribution.  
The Organization combined the contributions of the member nations into a common 
instrument for deterring war by preparing together to meet aggression if aggression 
should occur. I have no doubt that deterrence resulted not only from the military 
coherence achieved but also from the political unity of purpose it exemplified. If the 
dissolution of the former casts in doubt the latter, as it inevitably will, I fear that those 
who draw hope from Western disunity will be much encouraged.  
As you say, conditions have changed since 1949. They have greatly changed for the 
better, due significantly in my opinion to our combined efforts under the Treaty. But 
should our collective effort falter and erode the common determination which it reflects, 
the foundation of the present stability would be undermined.  
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In your letter you restated the firm commitment of France to fight beside her allies if any 
member of NATO should suffer unprovoked aggression. I respect that pledge. But we 
believe more is needed to achieve effective deterrence and to maintain peace in the North 
Atlantic area.  
I am puzzled by your view that the presence of allied military forces on French soil 
impairs the sovereignty of France. Those forces have been there at French invitation 
pursuant to a common plan to help insure the security of France and her allies. I have 
always viewed their presence as a wise and far-seeing exercise of French sovereignty.  
For our part, we continue to believe that if the Treaty is to have force and reality, 
members of the Alliance should prepare the command structures, the strategic and 
tactical plans, the forces in being, and their designation to NATO in advance of any crisis 
and for use in time of crisis. NATO arrangements should reflect the technological and 
strategic imperatives of our age. Readiness to fight instantly under agreed plans and 
procedures, worked out and practiced in peacetime, adds immeasurably to our common 
strength. We will continue our past policy of full participation and cooperation in NATO. 
We believe the member nations, working within the Alliance with one another, should 
adapt to whatever organizational arrangements the needs of the hour may require.  
I do not consider that such participation and cooperation involves any impairment of our 
own sovereignty--or that of any of our allies. In my judgment it reflects the exercise of 
sovereignty according to the highest traditions of responsible self-interest.  
The North Atlantic Treaty commits its signatories to assist any member subjected to 
armed attack within the areas specified. Governments, of course, must fulfill their 
commitments in accordance with their own constitutional procedures. But commitments 
should be honored as effectively as peacetime preparation can assure. It seems to me 
essential, therefore, that all members of the Alliance be prepared to act in any emergency 
through their mutual organization and in accordance with mutual plans. Reliance in crisis 
on independent action by separate forces in accordance with national plans, only loosely 
coordinated with joint forces and plans, seems to me dangerous for all concerned. It has 
proved disastrous in the past.  
The other fourteen member nations of NATO do not take the same view of their interests 
as that taken at this moment by the Government of France. The United States is 
determined to join with them in preserving the deterrent system of NATO--indeed, in 
strengthening it in support of the vital common purposes of the West. We do not intend to 





Indeed, we find it difficult to believe that France, which has made a unique contribution 
to Western security and development, will long remain withdrawn from the common 
affairs and responsibilities of the Atlantic. As our old friend and ally her place will await 
France whenever she decides to resume her leading role.  
Sincerely, 






























































THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
94 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
3. BTC Kenneth L. Klima 
USN (Retired) 
Wapakoneta, OH  
 
4. Ms. Margaret V. Klima 
North Canton, OH 
 
5. Dr Charles McAllister 
Catawba College 
Salisbury, North Carolina  
 
6. Corriher, Lynn, Black Library 
c/o Dr. Frederick Corriher 
 Salisbury, NC  
 
7. Commander Recca, Intelligence Programs Director 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
8. Professer Donald Abenheim 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
9. Professor David Yost 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California 
 
10.       LT Kenneth T. Klima 
USN 
Monterey, CA  
 
11. 1st LT Laura S. DeJong 
USAF 
Carmel Valley, CA 
95 
